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A S in previous years, this year's survey of commercial transactions
focuses on the Uniform Commercial Code as enacted in Texas.I While
Texas court decisions construing the Code continue to proliferate, most
published opinions do not break new ground. The major court decisions this
year, for example, are decisions on appeal which were discussed in last
year's Survey. 2 Other decisions, however, provide useful illustrations of the
operation of specific Code provisions. At the same time there appear to be
fewer instances in which application of the Code is overlooked.3
Given this focus on the Texas Code, two general caveats must be
stressed. First, Texas attorneys faced with Code problems should not ignore
general Code commentaries and out-of-state court decisions construing the
Code. 4 The Code itself instructs courts to construe the Code liberally to
promote the underlying purposes, one of which is "to make uniform the law
among the various jurisdictions." '5 In construing the Code, Texas courts
*B.A., LL.B., Harvard University; LL.M., University of London. Associate Professor
of Law, Southern Methodist University.
1. In this Article both textual and footnote citations are to the Texas Uniform Commercial
Code [hereinafter referred to as "the Code"] as incorporated in the first eleven chapters of the
Texas Business and Commerce Code, TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. §§ 1.101-11. 108 (Vernon
1968 & Supp. 1978). The Code became effective in Texas on July 1, 1966. 1965 Tex. Gen. Laws
ch. 721, at 1-316. In 1967 the Code became part of the Business and Commerce Code, and since
that date its provisions have been amended several times. The Code's provisions now generally
conform with the 1972 Official Text of the Uniform Commercial Code. The Code was amended
most recently by the Texas Legislature in 1977. For a discussion of these amendments see notes
9-18 infra and accompanying text.
2. Kimbell Foods, Inc. v. Republic Nat'! Bank, 557 F.2d 491 (5th Cir. 1977), rev'g 401 F.
Supp. 316 (N.D. Tex. 1975) (discussed in notes 173-75, 185-86 infra and accompanying text);
Nobility Homes of Texas, Inc. v. Shivers, 557 S.W.2d 77 (Tex. 1977), affg 539 S.W.2d 190
(Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1976) (discussed in notes 65-70 infra and accompanying text);
Nelson v. Union Equity Coop. Exch., 548 S.W.2d 352 (Tex. 1977), aff'g 536 S.W.2d 635 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1976) (discussed in notes 24-30 infra and accompanying text). The
lower court opinions in these cases are discussed in Winship, Commercial Transactions,
Annual Survey of Texas Law, 31 Sw. L.J. 165 (1977) [hereinafter cited as 1977Annual Survey].
3. Compare the number of cases listed in last year's Survey article in which the relevance
of the Code was not considered. 1977 Annual Survey, supra note 2, at 165 n.3. For a case
involving a lease of real property in which the Code did not apply see Aycock v. Vantage
Management Co., 554 S.W.2d 235, 237 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The
court in Aycock properly cited the Code as representative of legislative policy rather than as
controlling law.
4. A useful summary of research aids for Code problems is set out in R. BRAUCHER & R.
RIEGERT, INTRODUCTION TO COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS 40-48 (1977). Texts of Code decisions
are published in the UCC Reporting Service. Digests of Code cases appear in the Commercial
Law Journal, the UCC Law Letter, and the UCC Law Journal. An annual survey of Code
cases from all jurisdictions is published each year in The Business Lawyer. See, e.g., Uniform
Commercial Code Annual Survey, 32 Bus. LAW. 1065-1164 (1977). Relevant sections of the
State Bar of Texas publish periodicals which survey current developments. The Texas Associa-
tion of Bank Counsel began publication of The Texas Bank Lawyer in June 1977 on a monthly
basis with digests of current cases.
5. TEX. Bus. & COMN(. CODE ANN. § 1.102(a), (b)(3) (Vernon 1968). For a recent study
which suggests that uniformity is not being achieved see Minahan, The Eroding Uniformity of
the Uniform Commercial Code, 65 Ky. L.J. 799 (1977). A good general statement of the Code's
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
should give these resources considerable weight in the absence of Texas
amendments to the Code or definitive Texas court decisions. 6 A second
caveat relates to the continuing need of an attorney dealing with commercial
matters to be aware of statutes and the common law outside the framework
of the Code. Section 1.103 of the Code provides that principles of law and
equity supplement the Code unless displaced by the Code provisions.7 In
addition, important commercial topics such as arbitration, conversion, and
guaranty agreements remain unregulated or imperfectly regulated by the
Code. As in the past, an attempt is made in this Article to call attention to
recent developments in some of these extra-Code areas.8
With minor amendments the scope and format of this Article follow that
of last year. Brief sections on legislative developments and miscellaneous
Code decisions have been added. As was done last year, Texas devel-
opments with respect to creditors' rights are dealt with in a separate Survey
article.
I. TEXAS LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
The Sixty-fifth Legislature's forays into the domain of private commercial
law were modest. Only two laws amending the Code were enacted. The first
of these laws comprises amendments to chapter 9 as proposed by the State
Bar of Texas.9 The Act makes relatively minor non-uniform amendments to
the filing provisions and to provisions regulating who must be given notice
after default.' 0 Before these amendments sections 9.504(c) and 9.505(b)
required a secured party who wished either to dispose of repossessed
collateral or to retain the collateral in satisfaction of the underlying obliga-
tion to notify "any other secured party who has duly filed a financing
statement indexed in the name of the debtor in this state" as well as any
other secured party who gives written notice of his claim." This requirement
has now been modified so that notice must be given "to any other secured
party who has a security interest in the same collateral and who has duly
policy encouraging uniformity appears in Comment, Uniformity of the Commercial Code, 8
B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 568 (1967).
6. See generally Note, How Appellate Opinions Should Justify Decisions Made Under the
U.C.C., 29 STAN. L. REV. 1245 (1977).
7. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 1.103 (Vernon 1968). See Hillman, Construction of
the Uniform Commercial Code: UCC Section 1-103 and "Code" Methodology, 18 B.C. INDUS.
& COM. L. REV. 655 (1977).
8. The most important of these extra-Code commercial decisions are often discussed in
student case notes. See, for example, the case note discussions of Classified Parking Sys. v.
Dansereau, 535 S.W.2d 14 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1976, no writ) (bailment "fire
and theft" exception): Note, Rejection of the Fire and Theft Exceptions in Texas Bailment Law:
Classified Parking Systems v. Dansereau, 29 BAYLOR L. REV. 403 (1977); Note, Bailments-
Evidence-Proof of Theft of Bailed Goods Does Not of Itself Rebut Presumption of Bailee 's
Negligence, 8 ST. MARY'S L. REV. 359 (1976); Note, Bare Facts of Fire or Theft No Longer
Rebut the Presumption of a Bailee's Negligence, 8 TEX. TECH L. REV. 387 (1976). The Classified
Parking case is also briefly noted in 1977 Annual Survey, supra note 2, at 199.
9. 1977 Tex. Gen. Laws ch. 163, §§ 1-7, at 333-35 (codified in scattered sections of ch. 9,
TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN.). For a commentary on the State Bar's proposal, see Mehl,
Proposed Legislation Involving Chapter 9 of the Texas Business and Commerce Code (Texas
Uniform Commercial Code), 40 TEX. B.J. 63, 63-64 (1977).
10. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. §§ 9.402(d), .403(a), (b), .504(c), .505(b) (Vernon Supp.
1978).
11. 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws ch. 400, § 5, at 999.
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filed, in the office of the Secretary of State or the county clerk in the proper
county in this state, a financing statement indexed in the name of the
debtor." ' 12 Despite this amendment to the Code the notice requirement in
these provisions remains more stringent than the 1972 Official Text of the
Uniform Commercial Code.' 3
A second amendment to the Code appears in the Artists' Consignment
Act. 4 This piece of special legislation protects a work of art delivered to an
art dealer 15 for exhibition or sale, and any proceeds thereof, from the claims
of the dealer's creditors. Section 2.326(c) of the Code has been amended to
call attention to this exception to the general Code rule which subjects goods
on consignment to the claims of consignee's creditors. 16 When special ad-
vantages are given to such groups as artists and farmers, it is no doubt good
practice to call attention to these privileges by non-uniform amendment to
the Code as was done in this Act.' 7 Failure to amend the Code may mislead
the practitioner who is not familiar with a particular trade. Unfortunately,
proponents of special legislation have no interest in a general review of Code
provisions. The whole question of the Code's regulation of consignments,
for example, should be reviewed.' 8
Other recent state legislation of general interest to the practitioner of
commercial law includes amendments to usury laws 19 and revision of the
Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act. 2 More
specialized legislation is of interest to attorneys dealing with problems in
particular trades or industries. 2'
12. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. §§ 9.504(c), .505(b) (Vernon Supp. 1978) (emphasis
added).
13. The 1972 Official Text of the Uniform Commercial Code only requires notice to be
given to any secured party who has given timely written notice of his claim to the first secured
party. U.C.C. §§ 9-504(3), -505(2) (1972 version). The State Bar committee on the Uniform
Commercial Code balked at adopting the uniform text. See Mehl, supra note 9, at 64.
14. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 9018 (Vernon Supp. 1978); TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE
ANN. § 2.326(c) (Vernon Supp. 1978).
15. The Act apparently does not require that the work of art be delivered to an art dealer by
an artist. An original draft may have intended to limit the Act because the short title of the Act
is "Artists' Consignment Act." TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 9018, §§ 1,2(2) (Vernon Supp.
1978).
16. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. §§ 2.326(a)-(c) (Vernon 1968 & Supp. 1978).
17. Cf. id. § 1.104 (Vernon 1968) (construction against implicit repeal of Code provisions
by subsequent legislation). Special legislation to reverse adverse judicial opinions is not uncom-
mon. Following ultimate defeat in the In re Samuels case, Stowers v. Mahon, 526 F.2d 1238 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 834 (1976), farmers obtained both state and federal legislation. See
Pub. L. No. 94-410, 90 Stat. 1249 (1976) (codified in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.); TEX. REV.
Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6910b (Vernon Supp. 1978).
18. See generally Winship, The "True" Consignment Under the Uniform Commercial
Code, and Related Peccadilloes, 29 Sw. L.J. 825 (1975), reprinted in 2 CORPORATE COUNSEL'S
ANNUAL-1977, at 885 (H. Friedman, J. O'Brien & H. Schlagman eds. 1977).
19. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 5069-1.01 to -51.19 (Vernon 1971 & Supp. 1978).
20. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-.63 (Vernon Supp. 1978).
21. See generally STATE BAR OF TEXAS, TEXAS LEGISLATIVE HIGHLIGHTS 1977 (1977). Note,
for example, the revision of the Texas Mobile Homes Standards Act. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT.
ANN. art. 5221f (Vernon Supp. 1978). Mobile home sales and financing give rise to so many
legal problems that an entire course on commercial law could be taught using only the court
decisions dealing with mobile homes. See, e.g., Nobility Homes of Texas, Inc. v. Shivers, 557
S.W.2d 77 (Tex. 1977), aff'g 539 S.W.2d 190 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1976) (discussed in




A. Who is a "Merchant"?
Article 2 of the Code applies to all contracts for the sale of personal
property, except where a specific Code provision limits the application of its
rule to a transaction with a "merchant" or "between merchants." Section
2.104 of the Code defines these terms and the comments to that section
further elaborate on the scope and policy underlying the special provisions
applicable to mercantile transactions.22
Whether farmers are "merchants" under Article 2 has been a question
raised in a growing number of cases in recent years.2 3 The answer is incon-
clusive because state supreme courts have resolved the question both ways.
In Nelson v. Union Equity Co-operative Exchange24 the Texas Supreme
Court, over a strong dissent by four justices, affirmed a decision which had
found the defendant farmer in that case to be a merchant for the purposes of
an exception to the Code's statute of frauds. 25 This exception is that "be-
tween merchants" the requirement of the statute of frauds is met by a
written confirmation. The majority opinion in Nelson found that on the
undisputed facts the farmer met three distinct tests for being a merchant
within the definition of section 2.104(a): (1) he "dealt" in goods of the kind;
(2) by his occupation he held himself out as having knowledge or skill
peculiar to the practices involved in the transaction; and (3) by his occupa-
tion he held himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the goods
involved in the transaction. 26 By selling his annual crop the defendant
"trafficked" in or "transacted business" in wheat and therefore fell within
the dictionary definition of "dealing" in goods of the kind. Furthermore, the
defendant not only raised but also sold wheat. The court ruled that a person
who sells a commodity such as wheat, at least to the extent shown to be true
of the defendant, necessarily represents that he has knowledge of both the
goods and practices of selling wheat. The court noted that an experienced
farmer like the defendant would be expected to know the attributes of
wheat, such as grades and qualities, which are peculiar to the goods. The
majority opinion, quoting from the comment to section 2.104, also pointed
out that the trade practice in Nelson was the non-specialized business
22. See generally Dolan, The Merchant Class of Article 2: Farmers, Doctors, and Others,
1977 WASH. U.L.Q. 1. For a comment on the importance of the "merchant" provisions to the
assumptions underlying the drafting of article 2 see Winship, Jurisprudence and the Uniform
Commercial Code: A "Commote," 31 Sw. L.J. 843 (1977). It should be stressed that the fact
that one is a "merchant" for the purposes of the Code does not mean one is a "merchant"
under other statutes. But see Trial v. McCoy, 553 S.W.2d 199, 201 (Tex. Civ. App.-E Paso
1977, no writ). See note 64 infra.
23. See generally Squillante, Is He or Isn't He a Merchant?-The Farmer (pts. 1-3), 82
COM L.J. 155, 367, 430 (1977); Note, Uniform Commercial Code-Is the Farmer a "Merchant"
28 BAYLOR L. REV. 715 (1976); Note, The Farmer as a Merchant Under the UCC, 53 N.D.L.
REV. 587 (1977); Note, Lish v. Compton-Is a Farmer a Merchant Under the UCC, 1976 UTAH
L. REV. 558. See also UCC L. LETrER, Sept. 1977, at 3-4.
24. 548 S.W.2d 352 (Tex. 1977), aff'g 536 S.W.2d 635 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1976).
The opinion of the court of civil appeals is commented on in 1977Annual Survey, supra note 2,
at 168-70.
25. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 2.201(b) (Vernon 1968).
26. 548 S.W.2d at 355.
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practice of answering mail.27 The majority's approach, an expansive reading
of the merchant definition, was based on the broad language of section
2.104(a) and the fact that under the circumstances of the case the burden on
the defendant was not onerous.
An elaborate dissent read the statutory definition of merchant in the light
of what the dissent characterized as its "clear, ordinary meaning," which
stresses professionalism. Reviewing the facts mentioned in the majority
opinion, the dissent concluded that the facts did not indicate that the defend-
ant knew of the practice of sending a confirmatory memorandum.
While approving the result in Nelson, this reviewer does not find the
majority opinion helpful. The conclusion that the defendant "dealt" in
wheat because he "transacted business" in wheat suggests, as the minority
opinion pointed out, that virtually everyone who at some time buys or sells a
good, such as a used car, would be a merchant under the Code. Fortunately,
the majority opinion suggested, albeit obliquely, two possible limitations to
this broad reading of section 2.104. First, the facts of each case, it was
suggested, should be examined to evaluate the experience and scope of a
defendant's activities. 28 The opinion, however, did not indicate which facts
are to be given greater weight. Secondly, the opinion stressed the relatively
light burden imposed on the defendant by section 2.201(b). This suggests
that a farmer need not be a merchant within the meaning of all of the Code's
merchant provisions, thereby avoiding the higher obligations imposed on
merchants. 29 This approach followed from the implication in comment 2 to
section 2.104 and was consistent with the general approach of the Code to
extend or contract the scope of a Code provision in the light of its purpose or
'reason. ''30
The danger of misreading the scope of the Nelson opinion was realized in
Gray v. Kirkland.31 In Gray the Corpus Christi court of civil appeals stated
that the Code applied to the transaction before it because the Code applies to
farmers, citing Nelson.3 2 The Code, however, applies to transactions in
goods, especially sales of goods, not to classes of persons. 33 The Code
applied to the transaction in Gray because an alleged sale of cotton seed, a
"good" under the Code, was involved. 34 The opinion in Nelson is irrelevant
to the question of whether or not the Code applies to a particular transac-
tion.
27. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 2.201(b), comment 2 (Vernon 1968).
28. 548 S.W.2d at 355-56 ("He annually sold that crop himself; and in the five years
preceding the trial of this case, his sales were to a milling company."); id. at 356 ("A person
whose occupation includes the selling of a commodity, at least to the extent shown of Nelson
.... "). The dissenting opinion conveniently listed all the facts mentioned in the majority
opinion. Id. at 358.
29. For example, a merchant is held to a higher standard of "good faith." TEX. Bus. &
COMM. CODE ANN. §§ 1.201(19), .203, 2.103(a)(2) (Vernon 1968).
30. Id. § 1.102, comment 1.
31. 550 S.W.2d 410 (Tex. Civ. App.---Corpus Christi 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
32. Id. at 412.
33. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 2.102 (Vernon 1968).
34. Id. § 2.105(a).
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B. Formation of Contracts
Statute of Frauds. Section 2.201 of the Code states that a contract for the
sale of goods at a price of $500 or more is unenforceable "unless there is
some writing sufficient to indicate that a contract for sale has been made
between the parties and signed by the party against whom enforcement is
sought." ,35 The Code provides several exceptions to this formal requirement.
One exception has already been mentioned in connection with the discus-
sion of the Nelson case.36 Between merchants a written confirmation of an
oral agreement satisfies the Statute of Frauds unless the person receiving
the confirmation makes a timely written objection to its contents. 37 In
Nelson the Texas Supreme Court held that the defendant farmer, who had
failed to object to a written confirmation, was a "merchant" within this
exception. Even if a defendant is a merchant within this exception, a
plaintiff still has the burden of showing that a contract was entered into by
the parties.38
A second exception to the formal requirement of section 2.201 exists
where the parties enter into a valid agreement which is unenforceable
because of the Statute of Frauds, but which has been partially performed. 39
Physical receipt and acceptance of goods, for example, is considered an
unambiguous admission by both parties that a contract exists and is, there-
fore, a substitute for a writing. The party seeking to enforce the contract has
the burden of showing receipt and acceptance, which will usually be ques-
tions of fact. This exception is illustrated by Wilson v. Remmel Cattle Co. 10
In this case the plaintiffs sought to establish an oral contract for the pur-
chase of cattle. The jury found that there had been an oral contract but made
no findings with respect to the receipt and acceptance of the cattle by the
buyer. The trial court rendered judgment n.o.v. for the defendant on the
ground that the oral contract was "violative" of the Statute of Frauds.
Noting that a judgment n.o.v. is equivalent to a finding that there is no
evidence to raise an issue for the jury, the appellate court reversed because
the facts as to receipt and acceptance were in dispute. In order to enforce
the agreement the seller, in effect, had to establish both that there had been
an oral contract and that the buyer had received and accepted the cattle.41
Parties occasionally argue that there are non-Code exceptions to the
Statute of Frauds which permit an oral contract to be enforced. In H.
Molsen & Co. v. Hicks42 a cotton buyer sought to recover damages from
35. Id. § 2.201(a).
36. See notes 24-30 supra and accompanying text.
37. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 2.201(b) (Vernon 1968). See Note, Promissory
Estoppel and Farmer as a Merchant: The 1973 Grain Cases and the UCC Statute of Frauds,
1977 UTAH L. REV. 59.
38. See TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 2.201, comment 3 (Vernon 1968). In Nelson the
trial court had determined that the parties had entered into an oral agreement. 548 S.W.2d at
354.
39. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 2.201(c)(3) (Vernon 1968). See also id. § 2.201,
comment 2.
40. 542 S.W.2d 938 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
41. Id. at 941.




farmers who allegedly had agreed orally to sell their cotton to plaintiff. To
avoid the Statute of Frauds the plaintiff buyer alleged that the defendants
had promised to sign a written agreement but had failed to do so. The
plaintiff argued that the defendants, therefore, were estopped from raising
the Statute of Frauds because of the doctrine of promissory estoppel. The
appellate court, however, found that there was evidence the parties had not
reached agreement on the final terms of a contract, and, therefore, that real
property cases such as "Moore" Burger, Inc. v. Phillips Petroleum Co. were
distinguishable. 43 The court apparently assumed that when an agreement can
be shown the doctrine of promissory estoppel will apply notwithstanding the
terms of section 2.201. While this writer approves the result on the general
ground that the Statute of Frauds does more harm than good, in a proper
case a more elaborate analysis should be undertaken.'
Contract Formation. The Uniform Commercial Code rendered obsolete a
number of pre-Code limitations on contract formation. Section 2.204(c), for
example, provides that even an "indefinite" contract is enforceable "if the
parties have intended to make a contract and there is a reasonably certain
basis for giving an appropriate remedy." 45 When a term has been left open,
the Code may supply the term.46 If the parties exchange correspondence
during contract negotiations, then the Code encourages the finding of an
enforceable contract by abrogating the rule that offers and acceptances must
be mirror-images. 47
The legal effect of an exchange of correspondence was at issue in Tylan
Corp. v. Texas Materials Laboratories, Inc. 48 The defendant submitted to
the plaintiff a written purchase order for a reactor to be built by plaintiff.
The plaintiff replied with a letter setting out its understanding of the transac-
tion, including a price. Having received no answer to its letter, the plaintiff
commenced work, but was soon informed that the defendant would not
accept the reactor. The plaintiff sought to recover the amount it had already
spent in developing the reactor. The jury found that the defendant had
agreed to purchase the reactor but that the parties had not agreed on a price.
The lower court rendered judgment that the plaintiff take nothing, and the
appellate court affirmed after reviewing the facts but not the law. The
appellate court stated there was some evidence that the defendant did not
agree to the terms of the plaintiff's letter.
In Tylan the plaintiff should have recovered at least some amount on two
different theories. Given the jury finding of an agreement to purchase, the
court should have enforced the contract under section 2.207(c) and supplied
43. 492 S.W.2d 934 (Tex. 1972). See Comment, Promissory Estoppel Marches On-Moore-
burger, 28 BAYLOR L. REV. 703 (1976).
44. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMER-
CIAL CODE 59-60 (1972). See also Robert Johnson Grain Co. v. Chemical Interchange Co., 541
F.2d 207 (5th Cir. 1976) (alternate theories of "promissory estoppel" and estoppel to raise
Statute of Frauds not free from difficulty under state law).
45. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 2.204(c) (Vernon 1968). See also id. § 2.207(c).
46. See, e.g., id. §§ 2.305-.325.
47. Id. § 2.207.
48. 548 S.W.2d 811 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1977, no writ).
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the price term using section 2.305. The plaintiff could then have recovered
on the contract for the repudiation by the defendant.4 9 Alternatively, the
plaintiff should have sought to recover on the theory of promissory estop-
pel. Damages recoverable on this theory might have been limited to reliance
damages.50
Contract Terms-Parol Evidence. The Code restates the parol evidence
rule in section 2.202. While the statutory text does not make drastic changes
to the rule, the comments to the section state that the text "definitely
rejects" certain assumptions frequently made in pre-Code case law. For
example, the comment states that contract language does not have to be
found ambiguous before evidence of course of dealing or usage of trade can
be admitted to explain or supplement an agreement." Courts, however, have
not always been careful in distinguishing such evidence from other types of
evidence which continue to be subject to stricter standards of admissibility
under the parol evidence rule. In Monesson v. Champion International
Corp., Del-Mar Division,5 2 for example, the appellate court held that be-
cause contract language was ambiguous "therefore" extrinsic evidence was
admissible to show the intent of the parties, course of dealing, and usage of
trade. 5
3
Contract Terms-Output Contracts. Although the Code leaves the parties
to shape their own contract, when the parties have failed to supply a term,
the Code fills in the term under its supplementary provisions.14 One such
provision is section 2.306, which regulates output and requirements
contracts. This provision validates such contracts with the limitation that
they cover only "such actual output or requirements as may occur in good
faith." 55 The application of section 2.306 was discussed in Tennell v. Esteve
Cotton Co. 56 The contract for the sale of a cotton grower's "entire produc-
tion" included an estimate of the number of bales to be produced. Actual
production was far higher than the estimate, and the seller argued that he
was not required to supply more than an amount reasonably proportionate to
the contract estimate of his output. The court, however, concluded that
section 2.306 was not applicable because production was not to be measured
49. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. §§ 2.610, .703, .704(b), .706, .708 (Vernon 1968).
50. Plaintiff in the Tylan case may have been seeking damages based on promissory
estoppel because plaintiff sought to recover only its expenses up to the time defendant
informed plaintiff that it would not take the reactor. See generally J. MURRAY, MURRAY ON
CONTRACTS §§ 91-93 (2d rev. ed. 1974). Section 90 of the Restatement of Contracts has been
revised to provide that "[tihe remedy granted for breach may be limited as justice requires."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1973).
51. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 2.202, comment l(c) (Vernon 1968). Seeid. §§ 1.205,
2.202, .208. See generally Kirst, Usage of Trade and Course of Dealing: Subversion of the UCC
Theory, 1977 U. ILL. L. F. 811.
52. 546 S.W.2d 631 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
53. Id. at 637.
54. See generally J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 44, at 88-102.
55. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 2.306(a) (Vernon 1968). See generally Weistart,
Requirements and Output Contracts: Quantity Variations Underthe UCC, 1973 DUKE L.J. 599.




by the requirements of the buyer. 57 This -disposition did not answer the
contention that the contract was an "output" contract. Perhaps the court
meant that this contract for the sale of one crop did not call for the
continuing production, demands, and tenders which characterize most out-
put or requirement contracts. Nevertheless, the policy underlying section
2.306, which places good faith limitations on the party who has control over
the quantity produced under the contract, would appear to apply to the
Tennell contract in which the cotton grower controlled the amount pro-
duced. In any case the court's decision gave the seller the benefit of all
production over the estimate in a rising market. To the extent farmers can
control production, the decision removed the farmer's incentive to increase
production in a rising market and may lead to even higher prices for the
consumer.
C. Warranties
Four types of warranties are provided for in the Code: a warranty of title,
an express warranty, an implied warranty of merchantability, and an implied
warranty of fitness for a particular purpose. 58 In addition, the Code regulates
the disclaimer of warranties and the limitation of remedies for breach of
warranties. 59 The Code delegates to the courts the development of doctrines
regarding vertical and horizontal privity between parties. 6° These
"
6contract" warranties have traditionally had attributes which distinguish
them from "tort" remedies under negligence or strict liability theories.
Privity, for example, is often required under a contract theory but not under
a tort theory; notice may have to be given of breach of a contract warranty
while notice is not required to recover on a tort theory; and different statutes
of limitations may apply to the different causes of action. Although courts
still struggle with the traditional forms of action, many courts now make
functional distinctions on the basis of who the parties are and the nature of
the damage.6 1 Several recent Texas cases discussed below illustrate these
general principles.
57. 546 S.W.2d at 358.
58. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. §§ 2.312-.315 (Vernon 1968). Courts occasionally
confuse the different warranties. One recent Texas court confused the implied warranty of
merchantability (§ 2.314) with the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose (§ 2.315).
Signal Oil & Gas Co. v. Universal Oil Prods., 545 S.W.2d 907,21 UCC Rep. Serv. 470 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Beaumont 1977, writ granted). There is an implied warranty of merchantability that
the goods are "fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used" when the seller is a
merchant with respect to goods of the kind sold. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. §§ 2.314(a),(b)(3) (Vernon 1968). For this implied warranty of merchantability to apply it is unnecessary to
show that seller knew of a particular purpose for which buyer required the goods or that buyer
relied on seller's skill or judgment. A showing that seller knew of buyer's particular purpose
and that buyer relied on seller's skill or judgment is necessary when an implied warranty of
fitness for a particular purpose is relied on. Id. § 2.315.
59. Id. § 2.316, .719.
60. Id. § 2.318. This writer deplores this abdication of legislative responsibility. Why courts
should be better equipped to resolve the conflicting economic interests is difficult to under-
stand. Moreover, as the official comments to the Code indicate, the existence of a legislative
rule does not necessarily mean the end of further case law development. Id. § 2.313, comment
2. For an incisive criticism that the Code as a whole represents an abdication of legislative
responsibility see Danzig, A Comment on the Jurisprudence of the Uniform Commercial Code,
27 STAN. L. REV. 621 (1975).
61. For a useful discussion of the different policies underlying the contract warranty and
tort theories see Mid Continent Aircraft Corp. v. Curry County Spraying Serv., Inc., 553
S.W.2d 935, 938-40, 21 UCC Rep. Serv. 1273 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977, no writ).
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Warranty of Title. Section 2.312 of the Code states that seller warrants to
the buyer that "the title conveyed shall be good." 62 The scope of this
warranty was considered in Trial v. McCoy. 6 3 The buyer showed that the
antique gun he had purchased had been taken from him by police officers on
their information that the gun had been stolen. The gun was not returned to
the buyer, he sued the seller, and the trial court granted summary judgment
for the buyer. The appellate court held that disturbance of quiet possession
was sufficient to show a breach of the warranty of title and that the buyer,
therefore, did not have to prove that the gun in fact had been stolen. Citing
comment 1 to section 2.312 and cases from other jurisdictions in support of
its decision, the court held that the buyer was entitled to recover his actual
damages (the purchase price). 64
Privity. In an important decision the Texas Supreme Court in Nobility
Homes of Texas, Inc. v. Shivers65 held that "a manufacturer can be respon-
sible, without regard to privity, for the economic loss which results from its
breach of the Uniform Commercial Code's implied warranty of merchanta-
bility. "I The plaintiff consumer purchased from an independent dealer a
mobile home manufactured by defendant. The trial court found, inter alia,
that the mobile home was defectively constructed and not fit for the pur-
poses for which it was sold. The trial court rendered judgment for the
plaintiff for the difference between the reasonable market value of the
mobile home at the time of the plaintiff's purchase and the original contract
price. 67 The Beaumont court of civil appeals affirmed over a vigorous
dissent. The Texas Supreme Court affirmed with an elaborate opinion,
carefully reviewing the bases of its decision.
The supreme court's opinion stressed a number of points: (a) it would be
unfair to distinguish physical and economic loss when economic loss can be
62. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 2.312(a)(1) (Vernon 1968).
63. 553 S.W.2d 199, 22 UCC Rep. Serv. 48 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1977, no writ).
64. The court went on to consider whether the buyer was entitled as a "consumer" to
treble damages under the Deceptive Trade Practices--Consumer Protection Act, TEX. Bus. &
COMM. CODE ANN. § 17.50 (Vernon Supp. 1978). The court held that there was a disputed fact
question and remanded the case for a trial on the merits of this question. Although the court
cited § 2.104 of the Code (definition of "merchant") this section is irrelevant because the
Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act has its own definition. Id. § 17.45. Nor
did the court discuss the Act's substantive provision which a breach of warranty of title
violates. See id. § 17.46. As noted in note 20 supra, the Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer
Protection Act recently was amended extensively.
65. 557 S.W.2d 77, 22 UCC Rep. Serv. 621 (Tex. 1977), aff'g 539 S.W.2d 190,20 UCC Rep.
Serv. 15 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1976). For a discussion of the opinion of the court of civil
appeals see 1977Annual Survey, supra note 2, at 172-74. See also 8 ST. MARY'S L.J. 865 (1977).
66. 557 S.W.2d at 81. The supreme court's opinion in effect overrules the opinion of the
Amarillo court of civil appeals in Henderson v. Ford Motor Co., 547 S.W.2d 663, 667, 20 UCC
Rep. Serv. 1158 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977, no writ). The supreme court's opinion was
consistent with and went even further than the federal district court in Roberts v. General
Dynamics, Convair Corp., 425 F. Supp. 688, 690-91, 21 UCC Rep. Serv. 565 (S.D. Tex. 1977)
(privity not required when breach of implied warranty causes personal rather than economic
injury).
67. For a suggestion that the proper measure of damages should be based on the value of
the mobile home at the time it left the hands of the manufacturer and not the value at the time
plaintiff purchased it, see 1977Annual Survey, supra note 2, at 174 n.48. The reason given was
that the manufacturer should not bear the risk of depreciation in the hands of an independent
dealer. Id. An appellate court may now remand on the damage issue alone. TEX. R. Civ. P. 503.
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just as disastrous for an individual consumer; (b) a contrary holding would
encourage manufacturers to limit their liability by marketing their products
through thinly capitalized entities; (c) the court's decision was consistent
with the idea that the law of contract should govern economic damages and
the law of tort should govern physical damages; and (d) the decision would
avoid wasteful litigation because the manufacturer would be ultimately
liable anyway. The court also reasoned that the Code permitted the manu-
facturer to protect itself from unlimited and unforeseeable liability.68
Although the result and opinion in Nobility are consistent with the posi-
tion urged in last year's Survey,69 several limitations on the potential breadth
of the opinion arise from the facts before the court in that case. First, while
no attempt was made by the manufacturer to disclaim warranties or to limit
remedies, the court specifically recognized this practice as valid. A predict-
able result of Nobility will be concentrated attempts at boilerplate protec-
tion when a manufacturer sells to an independent dealer. Secondly, the
plaintiff consumer in Nobility did not seek consequential economic losses,
such as lost profits. Not having dealt with the ultimate consumer, the
manufacturer is usually in no position to calculate these consequential
economic losses into his costs. On the other hand, the manufacturer will be
in a better position to calculate the difference between the value of its good
with a defect and the value of the same good without a defect, even if these
values are retail rather than wholesale values. Thirdly, the point that the
defective product in Nobility could have caused the consumer "to lose his
entire life savings" was stressed.70 Thus, Nobility may be distinguished in
future cases when merchants are involved or the defective good is less
costly and important to the consumer.
A manufacturer may give an express warranty to the ultimate consumer
even if the manufacturer and consumer are not in privity. 7' An interesting
variation on this point arose in Clarostat Manufacturing, Inc. v. Alcor
Aviation, Inc. 72 The defendant manufacturer expressly warranted the quali-
ty of components that were sold directly to the plaintiff for use in an aviation
instrument. The plaintiff also indirectly purchased the defendant's compo-
nents from a subcontractor who had assembled the defendant's components
into instruments sold to the plaintiff. The court held that the plaintiff could
recover from the defendant as to these indirectly acquired components
because privity was not essential where the defendant made express warran-
ties directly to the plaintiff. The court also noted that the defendant knew of
the arrangement between the plaintiff and the plaintiff's subcontractor."
68. The court of civil appeals stressed broader points of equity and justice not emphasized
by the supreme court. 539 S.W.2d 190, 193-95 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1976). See 1977
Annual Survey, supra note 2, at 173.
69. 1977 Annual Survey, supra note 2, at 174.
70. 557 S.W.2d at 81.
71. See Henderson v. Ford Motor Co., 547 S.W.2d 663,20 UCC Rep. Serv. 1158 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo 1977, no writ). The court in Henderson apparently required privity to permit
recovery for economic loss resulting from a breach of an implied warranty, but recognized that
the manufacturer might be liable on an express warranty directed to the ultimate consumer. See
note 66 supra.
72. 544 S.W.2d 788 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
73. Id. at 791.
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Exclusion or Modification of Warranties. Section 2.316 of the Code vali-
dates agreements which exclude or modify warranties. 74 With careful atten-
tion to the wording of the Code, boilerplate language disclaiming all implied
warranties may be constructed. Many form contracts now include such
boilerplate disclaimers as a matter of course. The contracts in Henderson v.
Ford Motor Co. 75 illustrate the effectiveness of this language. The court
examined the language of the manufacturer's new car limited warranty
("this warranty is expressly IN LIEU OF any other express or implied
warranty... including any implied WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABIL-
ITY OR FITNESS") and the Motor Vehicle Contract between dealer and
consumer ("the described vehicle is purchased AS IS."). The court held
that the language of the Motor Vehicle Contract effectively excluded im-
plied warranties under section 2.3 16(c)(1). 76 The plaintiff also argued that the
limited express warranty had failed in its essential purpose, and, therefore,
the plaintiff had the benefit of all the remedy provisions of the Code.77 The
court dismissed this argument because the plaintiff had not pled and sub-
mitted evidence showing a failure of the limitation's essential purpose. 78
Another successful exclusion of implied warranties by the use of the
phrase "as is" arose in Mid Continent Aircraft Corp. v. Curry County
Spraying Service, Inc.79 The court further considered whether this same
contract language also effectively excluded liability under a strict liability
theory. The seller had sold a used aircraft "as is" to buyer. Soon after the
purchase the plane's engine failed while the plane was in flight and the plane
was damaged in the crash landing. The buyer sought to recover on strict
liability, negligence, and breach of implied warranties theories. The court
found the contract language had effectively excluded implied warranties.
After a lengthy review of the different functions served by the Code's
warranty rules and the strict liability rules developed at common law, the
court held that the rule of strict liability applied when a defect in the produce
rendered it unreasonably dangerous, even if the product was a used good
and the damage was only to the product itself. While conceding that two
business entities of equal bargaining power could waive or disclaim potential
liability imposed on a seller by the strict liability rule, the court held that an
"as is" clause with no reference to potential tort liability was not such a
74. TEX. BUS. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 2.316 (Vernon 1968).
75. 547 S.W.2d 663, 20 UCC Rep. Serv. 1158 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977, no writ).
76. The trial court had concluded that there were no implied warranties between manufac-
turer and consumer because there was no privity between the parties. The appellate court,
therefore, did not consider the effectiveness of the exclusionary language in the manufacturer's
warranty document. Id. at 667. Presumably the contract clause would be effective because it
both mentions "merchantability" and is conspicuous. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. §§
1.201(10), 2.316(b) (Vernon 1968).
77. 547 S.W.2d at 669; TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 2.719(b) (Vernon 1968). See
generally Anderson, Failure of Essential Purpose and Essential Failure on Purpose: A Look at
Section 2-719 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 31 Sw. L.J. 759 (1977); Eddy, On the "Essen-
tial" Purposes of Limited Remedies: The Metaphysics of UCC Section 2-719(2), 65 CALIF. L.
REV. 28 (1977).
78. 547 S.W.2d at 669.
79. 553 S.W.2d 935, 21 UCC Rep. Serv. 1273 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977, writ
granted). See 21 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 144 (Jan. 14, 1978). See also Keystone Aeronautics Corp. v.
R.J. Enstrom Corp., 499 F.2d 146 (3d Cir. 1974).
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waiver or disclaimer. One judge dissented on the ground that strict liability
should not extend to damage to the defective product. The dissenting opin-
ion characterized this loss as a loss from unfulfilled commercial expecta-
tions which is better governed by the provisions of the Code.80 The scope of
the majority's opinion is limited, however, by the nature of the product; a
defect in an airplane's engine renders it unreasonably dangerous to the
consumer or to his property."'
Notice of Breach as Prerequisite to Remedy. Section 2.607(c)(1) of the
Code requires the buyer who has accepted a good to notify the seller within
a reasonable time after he discovers the breach or should have discovered
the breach. Failure to notify the seller bars the buyer from any remedy. The
notice need not be formal, but should be sufficient "to let the seller know
that the transaction is still troublesome."8 2 In effect, the buyer must plead
and prove that this notice was given or his action will fail. This requirement
was illustrated in Clarostat Manufacturing, Inc. v. Alcor Aviation, Inc. 3
The plaintiff brought suit to recover damages from the seller for breach of
express and implied warranties with respect to component parts used by the
plaintiff in an assembled aviation instrument. At trial neither party request-
ed the submission of special issues inquiring whether the plaintiff gave the
defendant timely notice of the alleged breach of contract. The appellate
court held that the plaintiff had the burden of alleging and proving proper
notice and that the defendant had sufficiently called the issue to the atten-
tion of the trial court by requesting a determination of when the plaintiff
learned of the alleged breach. The court, therefore, reversed judgment for
the plaintiff and remanded for a new trial.
Code Warranties and Consumer Legislation. As draftsmen have become
more adept at disclaiming warranties and limiting remedies under the Code,
pressure from consumer groups for remedial legislation has increased. At
the federal level the Magnuson-Moss Acts4 and the rules issued under it by
the Federal Trade Commission regulate the use of warranties.8 5 At the state
level there have been a growing number of consumer protection acts adop-
ted. Texas has the Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act
which is incorporated into the Business and Commerce Code.86 The combi-
nation of federal and state regulations can be "explosive" 87 although the
80. 553 S.W.2d at 942.
81. On motion for rehearing the majority stressed that essential to its holding was the fact
that the defect rendered the product unreasonably dangerous to the user or to the consumer or
his property. 553 S.W.2d at 943. The court cites RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(1965) as a codification of the strict liability rule adopted in Texas.
82. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 2.607, comment 4 (Vernon 1968).
83. 544 S.W.2d 788 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.); see note 72
supra and accompanying text.
84. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (Supp. V 1975).
85. Commentaries on the federal legislation have proliferated. For a good review of the
changes made by the legislation, see Eddy, Effects of the Magnuson-Moss Act upon Consumer
Product Warranties, 55 N.C.L. REV. 835 (1977).
86. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-.63 (Vernon Supp. 1978).
87. See Comment, Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act and Magnuson-Moss: An Explo-
sive Combination, 29 BAYLOR L. REV. 559 (1977).
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recent legislative session limited somewhat the effectiveness of the Texas
Act. The Texas Act now gives a consumer a statutory remedy for "breach
of an express or implied warranty." 8 Relief includes three times the amount
of actual damages plus court costs and reasonable attorney fees,8 9 unless
"the defendant proves that he was not given a reasonable opportunity to
cure the defects or malfunctions before suit was filed," in which case relief
is limited to actual damages plus costs and fees. 9°
Several warranty cases have been brought under the Texas statute. In
Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Licht9 the plaintiff buyer sought to recover
under the statute from the importer for breach of an express warranty and
from the dealer for breach of its implied warranty. The plaintiff had bought a
Volkswagen from the dealer and had received an owner's manual and
warranty pamphlet. The car's engine caught fire three weeks later, and the
plaintiff brought suit under the statute. On rehearing the appellate court
noted that because liability was based on the statute the plaintiff did not
have to show that a defect existed at the time the car left the control of the
importer. The court affirmed judgment for the buyer against the importer.92
In Trial v. McCoy9 3 the appellate court assumed without specific citation
to the Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act that a breach
of a warranty of title provided by section 2.3 12 of the Code would also be a
violation of the Act.
D. Remedies
Rejection and Revocation of Acceptance. A number of changes to pre-
Code law made by the Uniform Commercial Code are directed at terminolo-
gy rather than underlying concepts. The Code's provisions on "rejection"
and "revocation of acceptance" are good examples of this point.' A buyer
may "reject" a good delivered or tendered under the contract if it fails "in
any respect" to conform to the contract. 95 Once a buyer accepts the goods %
88. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § i7.50(a)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1978). The definition of
"consumer" presumably includes a "merchant" as defined by the Uniform Commercial Code.
Id. H9 2.104, 17.45(4) (Vernon 1968). The Trial case casts a doubt on this interpretation. Trial v.
McCoy, 553 S.W.2d 199, 201-02 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1977, no writ). See note 64 supra.
The definition of "merchant" (anyone who is not a consumer) in § 17.45 was deleted by the
1977 amendments.
89. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(b)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1978). The Texas Supreme
Court recently held that treble damages under this section are mandatory. Woods v. Littleton,
554 S.W.2d 662, 668-69 (Tex. 1977), noted in 15 Hous. L. REV. 212 (1977).
90. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 17.50A (Vernon Supp. 1978).
91. 544 S.W.2d 442 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1976, no writ). The statutory recovery by
buyer was in addition to the reimbursement buyer received from his automobile insurance
carrier for the cost of repairs. Id. at 444.
92. The court also concluded that, in the absence of a statutory provision or a finding of
negligence on the part of the importer, the importer would not be ordered to indemnify the
dealer. For a new statutory provision on indemnification see TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. §
17.55A (Vernon Supp. 1978).
93. 553 S.W.2d 199, 22 UCC Rep. Serv. 48 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1977, no writ); see
notes 63-64, 87 supra and accompanying text.
94. See generally Whaley, Tender, Acceptance, Rejection and Revocation-The UCC's
"TARR "-Baby, 24 DRAKE L. REV. 52 (1974); Comment, Substantial Performance: The Real
Alternative to Perfect Tender Under the U.C.C., 12 Hous. L. REV. 437 (1975).
95. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 2.601 (Vernon 1968).
96. Id. § 2.606.
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he may "revoke his acceptance" only if the non-conformity "substantially
impairs its value to him." 97 The Code avoids using the term "rescission"
which caused confusion in pre-Code law.
98
While few changes have been made in pre-Code law in the area of
rejection and revocation of acceptance, failure to use Code language in
litigation frequently leads to confusion. In Explorers Motor Home Corp. v.
Aldridge9 the plaintiff buyers of a mobile home sought restitution from the
seller and the manufacturer on the ground that the mobile home was unfit
for the purpose for which it was designed and sold. The plaintiffs had used
the home for almost two years, and they did not tender return of the home to
the defendants. The trial court quashed the citation against the seller, but
rendered judgment for plaintiffs against the manufacturer. On appeal the
Beaumont court disregarded the objection that there was no privity between
the partiesl °° and focused on the relief sought. In the context of distinction in
contract law between restitution and damages, the court examined the
relevant Code provisions. The court found that as a matter of law'0 the
plaintiffs had accepted the mobile home by using the home for almost two
years and failing to give notice of rejection within a reasonable time after
taking delivery of the home. °2 Without discussing the possibility that the
plaintiffs might still have revoked their acceptance, 0 3 the court then ex-
amined the rules on recovery of damages and held that because the buyer
was entitled to recover the purchase price there must be a reduction in this
amount by the value of any benefit derived by the buyer from the good.
Since the evidence did not support a finding that the plaintiffs derived no
benefit at all, the court remanded the case for further consideration of this
point. The court also noted that the trial court had failed to consider the
unjust enrichment which would result from allowing the plaintiffs to retain
the mobile home while receiving the return of the purchase price.l°4
It is difficult to place the court's opinion in Explorers Motor Home within
the framework of Code remedies. Under the Code a plaintiff has a choice
between revoking acceptance and recovering the price paid plus damages, 0 5
or keeping the motor home and collecting damages." °6 To revoke accept-
ance, however, a plaintiff must comply with all the prerequisites of section
2.608, which include the plaintiff's showing that the non-conformity sub-
97. Id. § 2.608.
98. Id. § 2.608, comment 1.
99. 541 S.W.2d 851, 20 UCC Rep. Serv. 87 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1976, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
100. The court cited its decision in Nobility Homes on this point. The Texas Supreme Court
has since affirmed the decision of the Beaumont court in Nobility. See notes 65-72 supra and
accompanying text.
101. Although the question of whether notice of rejection was given within a reasonable time
is normally a question of fact, on the facts in this case the court found that reasonable minds
could not differ. 541 S.W.2d at 854.
102. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 2.602(a) (Vernon 1968). The court does not cite or
discuss § 2.606 which sets out the acts which constitute acceptance under the Code. Id. § 2.606.
103. Id. § 2.608.
104. In a colorful dissent Justice Keith agreed that the majority's exposition of the Code was
correct, but he argued that the record before the court conclusively established that plaintiffs
could not recover. 541 S.W.2d at 855.
105. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. §§ 2.608, .711(a) (Vernon 1968).
106. Id. §§ 2.714, .715.
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stantially impaired its value to him, that revocation was timely, and that
notice of revocation was given. Unless the motor home is worthless, the
plaintiff must tender the home back to the defendants. 0 7 If a plaintiff wishes
to keep the home, he could recover the difference between the value of the
home as accepted and its value as warranted, plus any incidental or conse-
quential damages.
Anticipatory Repudiation. Before a contract has been performed, one of
the parties may indicate that he will not carry out his contractual duties.
While section 2.610 of the Code governs this "anticipatory repudiation"
generally, 1° 8 several questions are left unresolved. For example, the Code
does not define what acts constitute repudiation;"° furthermore, the time
when damages for repudiation are to be measured remains problematic
under the present Code language." 0
Several recent Texas cases considered the problem of anticipatory repudi-
ation. In Jon-T-Farms, Inc. v. Goodpasture, Inc. III the plaintiff sought to
recover damages for the defendant's breach of a contract to sell grain to
plaintiff. At the end of the period for delivery specified in the contract the
defendant had delivered less than half the grain agreed upon. Pursuant to the
contract terms the plaintiff extended the time for delivery. In a letter sent
soon after the original time period elapsed, the defendant announced that
the original contract had expired and offered to extend the contract at
slightly more than a twenty percent "upcharge." The appellate court upheld
a jury finding that the letter constituted a repudiation under section 2.610 of
the Code. 1' 2 The court further found that the plaintiff's actions, including
the acceptance of several late car loads of grain and the suspension of
payment, did not constitute a waiver of repudiation because the acts were
authorized by section 2.610." 3 Failure to reserve formally rights under
section 1.207 of the Code was not relevant because the court held that this
statutory provision is permissive rather than mandatory.
The time when damages are to be measured in cases of anticipatory
repudiation by the buyer was at issue in Harris v. Gunner.114 The sellers in
that case sought to recover damages from the buyer for the anticipatory
repudiation of a contract to purchase two heifers a year, for three years.
107. Id. § 2.608(b). See also id. § 2.608, comment 6.
108. Id. § 2.610.
109. But see id. § 2.609(d) (failure to provide adequate assurance of performance constitutes
repudiation).
110. See Comment, Anticipatory Repudiation Under the Uniform Commercial Code: In-
terpretation, Analysis, and Problems, 30 Sw. L.J. 601 (1976).
III. 554 S.W.2d 743, 21 UCC Rep. Serv. 1309 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977, no writ).
112. The appellate court approved the submission of the following special issue as within the
discretion of the trial court: "Did Jon-T Farms, Inc., breach and/or repudiate Contract No.
16,811 ($2.70)? (Answer 'Yes' or 'No')." Id. at 750. Compare this special issue with the special
issues in Harris v. Gunner, 545 S.W.2d 856, 859-60, 21 UCC Rep. Serv. 1055 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Fort Worth 1976, no writ).
113. Throughout the opinion the court relied heavily on the comments to the Code. The
court, for example, rejected the applicability of § 2.612(c). The court cited comment 6 to § 2.612
to show that plaintiff had not reinstated the "installment contract." 554 S.W. 2d at 746.
114. 545 S.W.2d 856, 21 UCC Rep. Serv. 1055 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1976, no writ).
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After taking the first two heifers the buyer repudiated the contract. 11 5 The
appellate court noted that the pre-Code measure of damages for anticipatory
repudiation was the difference between the contract price and the market
value of the good at the time of the breach. The court concluded that section
2.708 of the Code did not necessarily foreclose use of this former measure of
damages, but in any case the Code granted a seller the option to await
performance and measure damages at that later time.116 The appellate court
thus affirmed the judgment for the plaintiffs based on this Code formula.
In Tennell v. Esteve Cotton Co. "7 the defendant cotton grower argued that
as a matter of law failure of the original buyer to give the defendant notice of
the assignment of the contract was a repudiation by the buyer which entitled
the defendant to suspend performance. The appellate court held that there
was no repudiation because the defendant had failed to demand assurance
from the assignee.18
Recovery of Damages by Buyer. Section 2.711 of the Code summarizes the
buyer's remedies for specific forms of contract breach in situations in which
the buyer ends up without the goods. In addition to the power to cancel and
to recover any part of the price already paid, a buyer may recover damages
under two separate damage measures: cover less contract price or market
price less contract price.Y9 If a buyer has accepted the goods but the seller
has breached a warranty, then the buyer may recover damages measured by
the difference between the value of the goods accepted and their value had
they been as warranted, as well as any incidental and consequential dam-
ages. 120
Although the text of the Code does not so state, an Official Comment to
section 2.713 suggests that the market less contract price damage formula
"applies only when and to the extent that the buyer has not covered. '"' 2
Several recent Texas cases examined the relation between the two damage
formulas. In Jon-T-Farms, Inc. v. Goodpasture, Inc.122 the defendant ar-
115. The bulk of the appellate court's opinion dealt with the consequences of plaintiffs'
failure to submit the complete "cluster of ideas" necessary to prove anticipatory repudiation.
Id. at 859-61. The statement of facts is ambiguous in several respects. It is unclear, for
example, whether or not seller made a written demand for assurances which would comply with
§ 2.609 of the Code.
116. Id. at 858-59; see TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 2.723(a) (Vernon 1968) (rule for
determining market price where action for anticipatory repudiation brought before time for
performance).
117. 546 S.W.2d 346, 21 UCC Rep. Serv. 978 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1976, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
118. Id. at 354 n.4. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. §§ 2.210(e), .609(a), .609(d), .610(Vernon 1968).
119. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. §§ 2.711-.713 (Vernon 1968). Trial courts occasionally
render judgment based on jury findings which do not conform with the Code formulas. The
appellate court in Wilson v. Hays, 544 S.W.2d 833, 21 UCC Rep. Serv. 522 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Waco 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.), for example, had to recalculate plaintiff's recovery in light of the
buyer remedy provisions of the Code.
120. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 2.714 (Vernon 1968).
121. Id. § 2.713, comment 5; cf. id. § 2.703, comment 1 (rejection of doctrine of election of
remedies with respect to seller). Imprecise pleading or argument may further confuse the
picture in a particular case. See Cooper v. Kruse-Reed, Inc., 554 S.W.2d 45, 48, 22 UCC Rep.
Serv. 683 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977, no writ). The Cooper case also suggests the
difficulty of determining whether a purchase is a proper substitute to constitute "cover." 554
S.W.2d at 48-49.
122. 554 S.W.2d 743, 21 UCC Rep. Serv. 1309 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977, no writ).
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gued that the plaintiff had covered in accordance with section 2.712 and,
therefore, was precluded from recovering under the damage measure of
section 2.713, the difference between market and contract price, on which
the plaintiff and the trial court had relied. The appellate court held that on
the seller's breach the buyer was free to choose the measure of damages.
The court further found that there was no evidence of specific purchases by
the plaintiff as a cover for the defendant's breach. By implication the court
suggested that if there had been evidence of a specific purchase to cover,
such cover would have constituted an election to recover under section
2.712. The seller's burden to produce evidence of cover by the buyer would
have been very heavy because the subject matter of the contract was grain,
a fungible commodity, and the needs of the buyer presumably remained the
same whether or not the seller breached. The court apparently would have
required the seller to show a contract made by the buyer soon after breach
for exactly the same amount that remained undelivered by the seller or some
other equally unequivocal evidence of cover.'2 3
Noting that pleadings which referred to both cover and market price were
not a model of correctness with respect to damages, the appellate court in
Tennell v. Esteve Cotton Co. 124 held that the plaintiff was not required to
allege the applicable measure of damages and that evidence was properly
admitted in the absence of any objections by defendant. The court, there-
fore, affirmed judgment for damages based on the market price on the date
the plaintiff learned that the defendant would not perform. In effect the
court held that the plaintiff could have recovered under either section 2.712
or section 2.713, whether or not the plaintiff-buyer had actually covered.
Whether the buyer was precluded from recovering damages for breach of
warranty because of the buyer's contributory negligence was at issue in
Signal Oil & Gas Co. v. Universal Oil Products.2 5 The plaintiff sought to
recover for damages caused by the rupture of a heater in an isomax unit in
an oil refinery. The buyer brought causes of action against the supplier of
the unit and its subcontractors based on negligence, strict liability, and
warranty theories. Regarding the warranty claim the jury found the units
were not reasonably suited for their intended use and that the unsuitability
was a proximate cause of the rupture. The jury failed to find, however, that
the defective condition of the unit was a producing cause of the tube rupture
which had led to the property damage for which the plaintiff sought recov-
ery. The appellate court ruled that because the plaintiff failed to heed the
warnings by the defendants of the risks of continuing to use the unit, there
123. The court in Jon-T-Farms also held that defendant should bear the extra expenses
incurred when plaintiff had to transport grain in its own trucks because railroad cars were in
short supply. The contract provided "FOB West Texas TEP Area." The court found that the
extra expenses would not have occurred had defendant performed, and that defendant, under
the contract, would have had to bear the expense of transporting the grain from its elevator to a
railhead for loading. Id. at 751-52.
124. 546 S.W.2d 346, 21 UCC Rep. Serv. 978 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1976, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).




could be no proximate cause of the consequential damages as required by
section 2.715 of the Code.
Remedies Outside the Code Framework. Attorneys faced with sales trans-
actions should not overlook possible remedies available under general legal
or equitable principles which apply to commercial transactions by virtue of
section 1.103 of the Code. 126 Common examples include rescission for
misrepresentation or mutual mistake of a material fact. In Plains Cotton
Cooperative Association v. Wolf, 127 for example, the plaintiff-sellers of
cotton sought rescission of contracts on the ground of mutual mistake.
Agents of the defendant 121 stated that the plaintiffs were contractually
bound by the oral negotiations and that the plaintiffs could withdraw from
the contract by giving written notice at least thirty days before harvesting.
Relying on these representations, the plaintiffs signed written agreements
without reading them. When the plaintiffs later tried to withdraw the defend-
ant insisted on delivery, and the plaintiffs brought suit to rescind. The
appellate court held that the plaintiffs' negligence, if any, would not bar
equitable relief in a suit for rescission based on a mutual mistake theory or in
a suit in which the plaintiffs had executed a contract in reliance on a false
representation made by the defendant.
E. Miscellaneous Sales Transactions
Consignment Sales. Tucked in the interstices of Articles 2 and 9 are rules
regulating the consignment transaction. 29 Several Texas cases last year
considered the application of these provisions. The appellate court in Buf-
kor, Inc. v. Star Jewelry Co. 130 had to resolve competing claims between a
consignor and a creditor of the consignee to jewelry in the hands of the
consignee. The creditor had levied execution on the jewelry, and the consig-
nor brought an action to try the creditor's right to the property. I3' The court
held that the consignment was a "sale or return" governed by section 2.326
of the Code so that the consignor did not have title or right to possession.
The court held that the consignor, having no title to or right of possession in
the jewelry, was not entitled to proceed under the procedure for the trial of
right to property. On the merits the decision is consistent with the substan-
tive rule that "goods held on sale or return are subject to such claims [of the
consignee's creditors] while in the buyer's possession.' 32 The Code says
nothing, however, about who has title or who has the right to possession in a
consignment arrangement, although traditionally the consignment transac-
126. For commentaries on § 1.103 of the Code, see articles cited in note 7 supra.
127. 553 S.W.2d 800 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977, no writ).
128. The issue of the authority of defendants' agents to make these representations was
resolved in favor of plaintiffs. The agents believed the representations; thus, there was a
"mutual" mistake as to the present legal effect of the parties' relationship. Id. at 804-06.
129. See generally Winship, supra note 18.
130. 552 S.W.2d 522, 22 UCC Rep. Serv. 388 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1977, writ ref'd
n.r.e.). See also Ada Oil Co. v. Dunlop Tire & Rubber Corp., 550 S.W.2d 129, 132 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Eastland 1977, no writ) (consignee bears risk of loss when received delivery of goods on
consignment).
131. TEX. R. Civ. P. 717-736.
132. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 2.326(b) (Vernon 1968).
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tion has been a principal-agent relationship in which the consignor retained
title. If the consignor cannot proceed to try the question of the right to
property, it is difficult to see how the consignor's interests may be protected
in a proper case. For example, the consignor should be protected where the
consignee is "generally known by his creditors to be substantially engaged
in selling the goods of others.' ' 33
III. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS
A. Rights of a Holder
All transferees of negotiable instruments want the status of holders in due
course who take an instrument free from virtually all defenses of any party
to the instrument. To reach this status the transferee must be a "holder" by
having the instrument transferred to him by "negotiation." Several permu-
tations on this basic theme were discussed in Estrada v. River Oaks Bank &
Trust Co. 134 In this case the bank made a loan to the debtor and took his note
secured by a collateral assignment of four unindorsed promissory notes
executed by the maker payable to the order of the debtor. On default by the
debtor135 the bank sued on the debtor's note and on the maker's notes. The
maker denied the bank's status as a holder in due course and asserted a
complete offset by virtue of an unsatisfied judgment which the maker had
against the debtor. The trial court granted the bank's motion for summary
judgment against the maker, and the maker appealed. The appellate court
held that the bank was not a holder in due course because the notes had not
been indorsed to the bank by the debtor-payee. Indorsement was necessary
because an instrument payable to order is negotiated by delivery along with
any necessary indorsement; without a proper negotiation the bank could not
qualify as a holder of the instrument. The court rejected the bank's argu-
ment that the collateral assignment was an effective indorsement under
section 3.202(b) of the Code because there was only one assignment for the
four notes transferred. Nor did the court accept the suggestion that the
indorsement was incorporated by reference from the attached collateral
assignment under section 3.119 of the Code. Citing out-of-state decisions,
the court noted that reference to collateral instruments in order to determine
proper indorsements would impede the use of negotiable instruments as a
medium of exchange in commerce. The court held that, unless the bank
could show that the debtor-payee was a holder in due course, 36 the bank
133. Id. § 2.326(c)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1978). Note also that the consignor may protect his
interest in the goods by filing under art. 9. Id. §§ 2.326(c)(3), 9.114, .408.
134. 550 S.W.2d 719, 22 UCC Rep. Serv 83 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1977, writ
ref'd n.r.e.). For a student case note on this decision see Note, Commercial Paper-Negotiable
Instruments-Signature on Single Collateral Assignment Does Not Serve as Indorsement on
Series of Promissory Notes, 9 ST. MARY'S L. J. 323 (1977). See also UCC L. LETrER, Feb. 1978,
at 4-5.
135. The court remarked that the debtor's original note had been renewed but made no
mention of whether the renewal released the security. See Bank of Austin v. Barnett, 549
S.W.2d 428 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, no writ), discussed in note 153 infra and accom-
panying text.
136. A payee may be a holder in due course under the Code. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN.
§ 3.302(b) (Vernon 1968).
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could proceed only as an assignee of the notes subject to all defenses and
equities to which the notes were subject in the hands of the debtor-payee.
The appellate court, therefore, remanded the case for further proceed-
ings. 137
The defenses available against a holder in due course were the subject of
Lucas v. Whitely. 38 The plaintiffs, holders of a note, sought to enforce the
note against the estate of a co-maker who was found by the jury to have
been mentally incompetent at the time his name was signed on the note
pursuant to a special power of attorney. Although the plaintiffs had acted in
good faith and had given valuable consideration in exchange for the note,
the appellate court reversed a judgment in their favor. The court found
conclusive the two jury findings that the decedent had been mentally incom-
petent at the time he signed the special power of attorney, and that the
plaintiffs had "dealt" with the decedent through his agent. Having dealt
with the decedent, the plaintiffs, even if holders in due course, did not take
the note free from the defense of incapacity under section 3.305(b) of the
Code. 139 The note was, therefore, voidable at the election of the decedent or
his representative. The court also noted that article 5561a of the Texas
Revised Civil Statutes"4 did not apply because the decedent had not re-
ceived the consideration advanced by the plaintiffs and therefore had noth-
ing to restore to them.
B. Liability of Parties
Accomodation Parties. After the excitement of the Bohart4' decision in
last year's survey period, this year has been relatively calm, although the
Bohart decision has had continuing impact. In V.I.P. Commercial Contrac-
tors v. Alkas 42 an individual co-signatory of a note, which provided on its
face for interest of twelve percent per annum, raised for the first time on
appeal the question of whether summary judgment was proper on the note
which was allegedly usurious on its face. The court of civil appeals assumed
as true appellee's undenied sworn statement that the appellant co-maker had
acted as a surety or guarantor of the note on an obligation owed by his
corporation. Citing the language of article 1302-2.09 of the Texas Miscel-
137. The court also held that the offset claimed by the maker of the note was not sufficiently
proved, leaving a material fact issue in dispute. The claimed offset was based on a judgment for
the maker against debtor-payee. The court suggested that the maker might not have been an
accommodation party to the notes on which the maker recovered judgment and that the plaintiff
bank in Estrada should have been permitted to inquire into this matter. 550 S.W.2d at 729.
Because the maker had already obtained a judgment against the debtor-payee, it is difficult to
see how the bank could defeat this judgment.
138. 550 S.W.2d 767, 22 UCC Rep. Serv. 95 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977, writ ref'd
n.r.e.), noted in UCC L. LETTER, Feb. 1978, at 5-6.
139. Because plaintiffs had dealt with the decedent, the court mentioned but did not decide
whether the defense of incapacity was cut off under § 3.305 of the Code. 550 S.W.2d at 769.
Since under pre-Code law incapacity made the note voidable rather than void, the defense of
incapacity should be ineffective against a holder in due course who has not dealt with the
incapacitated party. See TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 3.305(b)(2) (Vernon 1968).
140. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5561a (Vernon Supp. 1978).
141. Universal Metals & Mach., Inc. v. Bohart, 539 S.W.2d 874 (Tex. 1976). See 1977
Annual Survey, supra note 2, at 179-82.
142. 553 S.W.2d 656 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1977, no writ).
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laneous Corporations Act 43 and the recent Bohart decision, the court held
that as a guarantor or accommodation maker the appellant could not assert
the defense of usury even though he was an individual and was primarily
liable on the note.
In Willmon v. Sigma Steel Inc. '4 the guarantor of a note sought to enforce
it against an accommodation maker. After the co-makers had defaulted on
the note, the guarantor paid the note and had it transferred to him. Working
without a statement of facts indicating the nature of the guaranty agreement,
the appellate court affirmed a judgment for the guarantor for the full amount
of the note, ruling that the doctrine of contribution, did not apply between a
guarantor of an obligation for which a note is given and an accommodation
co-maker of the note.
-Conversion. In Allen v. Alison Mortgage Investment Trust 45 a check is-
sued to two corporate payees jointly had been endorsed with the typed
names of both corporations and the signature of the president of the second
payee. The check had been deposited in the second payee's bank account
and immediately withdrawn by the president for his personal benefit. The
two payees brought suit for conversion against the president, the depository
bank, and the drawer of the check. The appellate court reviewed the lower
court's decision overruling the president's plea of privilege. The court held
that there was adequate evidence that both the president and the bank had
converted the check under sections 3.116(2) and 3.419(a)(3) of the Code. The
court, therefore, ruled that venue was proper in the county of the defendant
bank's residence under subdivisions 4 and 9 of article 1995.'46
Impostor Rule. In Fair Park National Bank v. Southwestern Investment
Co. 147 the drawer of a draft delivered it to a person posing as one of the two
payees. A third person presented the draft to a collecting bank with the
purported endorsements in blank of both payees. After forwarding the draft
for payment, the collecting bank delivered a cashier's check drawn on itself
to the person presenting the draft. The drawer sued the collecting bank,
among others, for breach of warranty and negligence. With respect to the
alleged breach of warranty the court found that the indorsements were
effective under the impostor rule of section 3.405(a)(1) of the Code. 14 The
drawer claimed that the impostor rule did not apply because there were two
payees, and only one impostor had induced it to transfer the draft. The court
held that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding that
there had been two impostors, and that the rule applied even though the
second impostor had not met the drawer face to face. The court went on to
143. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1302-2.09 (Vernon Supp. 1978).
144. 551 S.W.2d 142 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1977, no writ).
145. 548 S.W.2d 783 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1977, no writ).
146. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 1995(4), (9) (Vernon 1964).
147. 541 S.W.2d 266, 20 UCC Rep. Serv. 454 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1976, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
148. This section provides that an indorsement by an imposter of a named payee is effective
if the impostor has induced the maker or drawer to issue the instrument to him or his




indicate, however, that even if the second payee, who had not approached
the drawer, had been legitimate, the indorsements would still have been
effective under section 3.405(a)(1): "We interpret this language to mean that
if an instrument is payable to A and B, and X, by impersonating A, induces
the drawer to deliver the instrument to him, then X, or anyone else, can
make effective endorsements in the names of both A and B.' ' 49 The court
stressed that its interpretation is consistent with the policy of the imposter
rule which is to throw the loss on the person who first dealt with the
impostor and who presumably had the best opportunity to detect the fraud.
As to the claim of negligence against the collecting bank in Fair Park, the
court rejected the drawer's contention on two grounds. First, section
3.405(a)(1) makes all indorsements in the name of the payee effective so that
acceptance and payment of the draft is final under section 3.418 of the Code.
The collecting bank can have no more liability for negligence than for breach
of warranty. 150 The court also noted that section 3.405 does not impose
liability for failure to use ordinary care whereas closely related sections,
particularly sections 3.406 and 4.406, do explicitly impose liability for negli-
gence. The court concluded from the absence of this language in section
3.405 that negligence on the part of the collecting bank was irrelevant.' 5 1
Unauthorized Completion. Section 3.115 of the Code states that if an
instrument is incomplete in any necessary respect it cannot be enforced until
completed, but when it is completed in accordance with authority given it is
effective as completed. The burden of establishing that completion was
unauthorized is on the party so asserting. In Antrim v. McMurrey5 the co-
makers of a note defended an action brought to enforce the note with the
argument that the note was incomplete when signed and completed without
authority. The court held that although the Code did not specifically au-
thorize a transferee to complete an incomplete instrument, the same result
was reached by placing the burden of proof on the party asserting that
completion was unauthorized. The court concluded that the co-makers had
not produced evidence that the payee lacked authorization to complete the
blanks and reversed a judgment for the co-makers.
C. Discharge
The holder of an instrument may discharge any party to the instrument by
cancellation. Frequently a holder will cancel an instrument when renewing
or consolidating obligations which will be represented by a new instrument.
In Bank of Austin v. Barnett153 the debtor argued that a cancellation which
had taken place under such circumstances discharged him under section
3.605 of the Code and therefore released the personal property securing the
149. 541 S.W.2d at 269.
150. Id. at 270.
151. Id. at 270-71.
152. 549 S.W.2d 463,21 UCC Rep. Serv. 1091 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, no writ), noted
in UCC L. LETER, Dec. 1977, at 2-3; cf. First Nat'l Bank v. Walker, 544 S.W.2d 778, 784-85.
(Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1976, no writ) (completion of incomplete non-negotiable instrument).
153. 549 S.W.2d 428, 21 UCC Rep. Serv. 1127 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, no writ).
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indebtedness. The secured party had financed the debtor's purchase of
paintings over a number of years. The debtor signed notes and granted the
bank security interests in the pictures. In a complicated series of transac-
tions the notes were renewed and combined, and the cancelled notes were
returned to the debtor. A new security agreement was not always signed on
renewal although a description of the collateral was listed in or attached to
the renewal note. The debtor argued that the return of the cancelled notes
had released the original indebtedness and the collateral securing that in-
debtedness. The court held that section 3.605 of the Code did not alter the
rule that the renewal note merely evidenced a new promise with respect to
the original indebtedness. The original collateral would, therefore, continue
to secure the indebtedness unless the parties intended to release the collater-
al. The court found insufficient the evidence that the bank intended to
release the security, and judgment for the debtor was reversed.
Unless the parties otherwise agree, a party who accepts an instrument as
payment for an underlying obligation has the obligation suspended until the
instrument is due. If the instrument is dishonored, the holder may then
maintain an action on either the instrument or on the "revived" underlying
obligation.154 Several recent cases considered this basic principle. In Stone
Fort National Bank v. Elliott Electric Supply Co. 155 the court considered
whether the receipt of a note made by third parties reduced the amount
owed by the transferor of the note to the transferee. The court held that the
mere transfer of the note did not constitute absolute payment in the absence
of any evidence that the parties had agreed otherwise, and evidence that the
transferee had brought an action to enforce the note implied that it had been
dishonored. On dishonor the underlying obligation had revived under sec-
tion 3.802, and until the amount of the note was actually collected in the
action against the maker the underlying obligation was still outstanding.
In Kaiser v. Northwest Shopping Center, Inc. 156 the defendant argued that
his obligation to pay rent had been discharged by the landlord's retention of
the rent checks for an unreasonable period of time before presenting them
for payment. The Dallas court of civil appeals held that under sections 3.601
and 3.802 of the Code retention of the check did not discharge either the
check or the underlying obligation. The court distinguished cases which held
that when the payee retains a check tendered in full payment of a disputed
claim the payee is deemed to have "accepted" the amount in settlement and
is barred from recovering the alleged balance due. The court suggested that
acceptance as used in those cases means the creditor treats the check as
cash. The court went on to indicate that although instruments should be
presented for payment within the time limits set out in section 3.503, that
section does not provide for a discharge if presentment is delayed. An
unexcused delay will discharge the drawer of the instrument only if the
drawee has become insolvent in the interim.
154. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE. ANN. § 3.802(a)(2) (Vernon 1968).
155. 548 S.W.2d 441 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).




Banking Cases. In Gulf Coast State Bank v. Emenhiser" a sight draft had
been presented to the plaintiff bank for collection by an alleged agent of the
defendants. The bank advanced funds but the draft was subsequently dis-
honored because of the insolvency of the drawee. The plaintiff then sought
to hold the defendant drawers on the draft, but the defendants denied that
the purported agent had any authority. After a trial by jury the trial court
rendered a take nothing judgment against the plaintiff bank. The appellate
court affirmed, and the supreme court has granted a writ of error. The
plaintiff alleged on appeal that the trial court erred when it refused to allow
the plaintiff to introduce evidence showing that the plaintiff had acted in
compliance with the local custom of advancing cash on sight drafts. The
plaintiff argued that the defendants, whether or not they knew of the
custom, must be held to have agreed to be governed by the custom. The
appellate court held that the plaintiff's pleadings were inadequate because
there was no allegation that the plaintiff's custom was to treat all sight drafts
in the same manner as defendants' draft had beentreated, and there was no
allegation that the defendants had known of the custom. The court also held
that the plaintiff had failed to carry its burden of proving the authority of the
agent.
The bank's right of set off was the subject of Sears v. Continental Bank &
Trust Co. 158 The plaintiff sued his bank to recover money from his general
account after the bank had set off against this account a note on which he
was a co-maker. The court of civil appeals commented that the note was not
in evidence and held that there was no evidence produced or offered which
would show that the plaintiff suffered damage because of the bank's
actions. The Supreme Court reversed in an unpublished opinion.
In South Central Livestock Dealers, Inc. v. Security State Bank'59 the
creditor bank did not fare so well. The appellant cattle investors appealed a
directed verdict for the appellee bank in an action against the bank for
wrongful offset and tortious interference with contractual relations. The
Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded, finding some evidence that the inves-
tors had been in a principal-agent relationship with the feedlot which was the
customer of the defendant bank, and some evidence that the bank had
known the feedlot's bank account equitably belonged to third parties even
though the parties had not established a "special account."'" The court
found Texas precedent for the proposition that if a bank knows that a
depositor holds funds in a fiduciary capacity in an account in his own name,
then the bank may not offset these funds against the individual indebtedness
of the depositor. The court also found some evidence that the feedlot was
solvent when the defendant bank acted, mandating a reconsideration of the
157. 544 S.W.2d 722 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1976, writ granted).
158. 553 S.W.2d 394 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1977, no writ).
159. 551 F.2d 1346, 21 UCC Rep. Serv. 834 (5th Cir. 1977).
160. To establish a special account the bank must agree to hold and distribute funds
according to the agreement between the parties. Defendant bank in the South Central Livestock
Dealers case did not so agree. Id. at 1349.
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claim that the bank's action tortiously interfered with the feedlot's relations
with its customers.
Instruments Payable to Two or More Persons. Section 3.116 of the Code
sets out a rule for negotiation, discharge, or enforcement of an instrument
payable to the order of two or more persons. The interplay of this rule with a
bank's authority under section 4.205 of the Code to supply the missing
indorsement of a customer is illustrated by the recent case of Leinert v.
Sabine National Bank.1 61 In the Leinert case a cashier's check was issued to
"Defendant Bank and A or B." The check was deposited in an account with
the defendant bank on which A or C were authorized to make withdrawals.
The check was indorsed before deposit in the account with only the regular
stamped indorsement of the defendant bank. C then withdrew the amount of
the cashier's check and deposited the sum in another account. The executor
of A's estate brought an action against the defendant bank for loss of the
proceeds. The Beaumont court of civil appeals concluded that the defendant
bank had acted legally, if not commendably, when it deposited the check
and allowed a joint owner of the account to withdraw the deposit. The check
could be negotiated either by "Defendant Bank and A" or by "B. 1 162 The
defendant bank indorsed the check and it could supply the indorsement of
its customer, A.163 Withdrawal from the account by a joint owner (C) is also
authorized."6 The net result is no liability for the defendant bank.
Statute of Limitations. In Allied Chemical Corp. v. Koonce165 the assignee
of a demand note sought to enforce it against the maker. The petition
showed on its face that more than four years had run before suit was brought
and the maker pleaded the four-year statute of limitations." The plaintiff
produced correspondence signed by the maker and addressed to the plaintiff
which acknowledged the existence of a debt and a promise to pay. The
plaintiff argued alternatively that the correspondence represented a waiver
of the statute of limitations, or it estopped defendant from asserting the
statute. The plaintiff, in other words, did not argue that its action was on a
new promise but relied on the old one represented by the note. The court
held that the claim should have been based on the new promise. Further-
more, there was no allegation that the plaintiff was the owner of the debt at
the time of the correspondence. The appellate court held that for an ac-
knowledgement to be effective it must be made to or for the benefit of the
party to whom the debt is then due.
In Bacher v. Maddux167 the maker of an installment note defended an
action to enforce the note by raising the defense of the statute of limitations.
161. 541 S.W.2d 872, 20 UCC Rep. Serv. 414 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1976, writ ref'd
n.r.e.). An editorial note to the report in the UCC Reporting Service suggests the Beaumont
court's construction of 3.116 of the Code is unreasonable. 20 UCC Rep. Serv. at 415.
162. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 3.116 (Vernon 1968).
163. Id. § 4.205(a).
164. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 342-706 (Vernon 1973).
165. 548 S.W.2d 80 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1977, no writ).
166. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5527 (Vernon 1958).
167. 550 S.W.2d 405 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, no writ).
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The defendant had made substantial prepayments but made no payments
after July 1, 1971, at which time $1,450 of principal remained unpaid. Suit
was brought on August 31, 1976. The defendant argued that the cause of
action arose when he failed to make the January 1 and July 1, 1972, pay-
ments. The court held, however, that because of the prepayments, which
were to be applied to the installments first arising, nothing was actually due
in 1972 and the cause of action did not arise until 1974.
Stop Payment. In Bank of El Paso v. Powell 18 a customer purchased a
money order from his bank and before payment of the order requested the
bank to stop payment. The bank agreed to do so after the customer agreed to
hold the bank harmless for the costs and expenses it would incur by refusing
payment. On refusal by the bank to pay the order, the payee brought suit
against the bank. The customer and a third party intervened. After extended
litigation the court awarded judgment for the bank against the intervenors
for attorney's fees and the interest the bank had been required to pay on the
payee's judgment against the bank. The court, however, offset against this
sum the interest earned by the bank prior to judgment on the amount paid
for the money order. The court construed the hold harmless clause to mean
that only actual losses would be paid by the customer and not that the
customer would discharge the bank's liability. The trial court, therefore,
properly took into account the bank's benefit in the form of the interest it
had earned on the purchase money for the money order pending final
settlement of the litigation between the parties.
IV. SECURED TRANSACTIONS
A. Scope of Article 9
Relation of the Code to Federal Law. Two important Fifth Circuit opinions
in this survey period considered the interaction of federal and state law in
the enforcement of secured notes assigned to the Small Business Adminis-
tration pursuant to the SBA's loan guaranty program. In both cases the
governing documents, signed by the original parties, included a clause
stating that the terms of the security agreements were to be construed
according to the law of Texas. On default by the debtors the secured notes
were transferred to the Small Business Administration. In one case the law
governing the rights of the SBA and the debtor was at issue, while in the
other case the law governing priority when the SBA is competing for priority
with a third party claimant to the same collateral was at issue.
In United States v. Terrey' 69 the question before the court was what
standard governed the conduct of the SBA when it sought to realize on
repossessed collateral when there was no competing third party claimant.
The court held that federal law governed the transaction because the SBA
acted pursuant to federal constitutional and statutory authority. Since
Congress had not imposed any particular standard of care regarding disposi-
168. 550 S.W.2d 383 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1977, no writ).
169. 554 F.2d 685, 21 UCC Rep. Serv. 1488 (5th Cir. 1977).
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tion of collateral by the SBA, the court was obligated to fashion a standard.
The court determined that when all the relevant documents were construed
together the SBA had contracted for the application of Texas law and
therefore applied the Code as the federal law of decision. 70 The court
specifically noted that it did not have to decide what the federal law of
decision would be in the absence of contractual provisions, but it did note
that the Uniform Commercial Code had been widely adopted and that its
rules did not threaten the SBA's voluntary loan guaranty program. 171 In
effect the court held that the SBA may waive its right to have federal law
apply to a transaction, at least with respect to the other parties to an SBA
agreement. 172
The Fifth Circuit came to the same conclusion in Kimbell Foods, Inc. v.
Republic National Bank173 in deciding whether a similar choice-of-law
clause in a security agreement had waived the SBA's right to have federal
law applied in evaluating the priority of its security interest in the same
collateral claimed by another secured party. In a thorough, well-reasoned
opinion the court held that there had been no waiver and that the federal
common law rule of "first in time, first in right" was the relevant rule of
decision. The court's construction of the relevant federal rule will have far-
reaching consequences with respect to non-tax federal liens. First, it reject-
ed the lower court's extension of the "choateness" doctrine to the SBA's
lien. 74 Secondly, the case concerned collateral which secured inventory
sales made on open account, and the court suggested that in a proper case it
would adopt the Uniform Commercial Code rule with respect to priority
when such future advances are involved. In the case before it the court ruled
that the other secured party had priority under both the Code rule and the
stricter "actual notice" rule 175 so that the court did not have to define
federal common law more closely. In effect, the court's opinion suggests the
considerable influence that the Code has in shaping federal common law
developing around the commercial activities of the federal government.
Lease or Security Interest. Regardless of the form of the transaction the
Code applies if the parties intended to create a security interest in personal
170. Id. at 692-93.
171. The court felt that local banks might be more willing to participate in the program if
their agreements were governed by local laws with which they regularly dealt. This would not
force the government to face disparate responsibilities in different states, however, because the
UCC governs commercial transactions in forty-nine states. Id. at 693 n.8.
172. The choice-of-law regulation governing SBA contracts requires that they be "construed
and enforced in accordance with applicable Federal law." 13 C.F.R. § 101.1(d)(2) (1977).
173. 557 F.2d 491 (5th Cir. 1977), rev'g 401 F. Supp. 316 (N.D. Tex. 1975). For a discussion
of the district court opinion, see 1977 Annual Survey, supra note 2, at 194-95. See also Burke,
Secured Transactions, Uniform Commercial Code Annual Survey, 31 Bus. LAW. 1583, 1586-87,
1590-91 (1976).
174. 31 U.S.C. § 191 (1970). This section requires that in settling the affairs of certain
insolvents "the debts due to the United States shall be first satisfied." Under the choateness
doctrine this priority defers only to specific and perfected (choate) liens which are prior in time.
557 F.2d at 498-502.
175. At the time the advances in question were made the secured party did not have actual




property, 176 but the Code gives more specific guidelines for distinguishing a
true lease from a disguised security agreement. If the lessee has the option
to become the owner of the leased property for a nominal consideration, for
example, the lease is presumed to be intended for security and therefore
subject to article 9 of the Code. 177 In Robinson v. Granite Equipment
Leasing Corp. 178 the defendant had leased an ice machine under a detailed
lease agreement. After the machine broke down the lessee placed it in
storage, requested lessor to take it back, and stopped payment of the
monthly rental. Although notices of sale were sent to the defendant, the
lessor did not sell or rent the machine. On appeal from an adverse judgment
in an action brought to collect unpaid rent, the defendant lessee argued that
the lease agreement was really a security agreement subject to the provi-
sions in sections 9.504 and 9.505 of the Code that allow a secured party to
dispose of the collateral on default while crediting the debtor with the
proceeds in excess of the reasonable expenses of disposition. After review-
ing the terms of the agreement and the record, however, the appellate court
found that there was some evidence to support an implied finding by the trial
court that the instrument was a straight lease not subject to article 9 of the
Code.
B. Creation and Scope of Security Interest
Incomplete Security Agreement. Section 9.203(a)(1) of the Code requires
that the creditor, in order to obtain an enforceable security interest in a
debtor's property, either take possession of the debtor's property or sign a
security agreement that contains a description of the collateral. In Means v.
United Fidelity Life Insurance Co.'79 the debtor sought a declaration that
two security agreements were invalid because they had been signed without
a description of the collateral, the description having been completed later
by a bank employee. The jury found that the bank employee had authority
from the husband, but not the wife, to complete the security agreement. The
appellate court held that authorization from the husband was sufficient and
that, by analogy to the applicable rule governing negotiable instruments,' 80
the agreement should be enforced to the extent authorized.
Validity of "Dragnet" Clause. In the course of its opinion in Kimbell
Foods, Inc. v. Republic National Bank 8' the federal circuit court con-
176. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 9.102 (Vernon Supp. 1978). It should be noted,
however, that a lease of goods may be chattel paper. The Code governs both security interests
in chattel paper and the sale of chattel paper. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. §§ 9.102(a),
.105(a)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1978). See Hillcrest State Bank v. Bankers Leasing Corp., 544 S.W.2d
727, 20 UCC Rep. Serv. 1330 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (court may treat
absolute assignment as an assignment for security only).
177. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 1.201(37) (Vernon Supp. 1978).
178. 553 S.W.2d 633 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
179. 550 S.W.2d 302, 21 UCC Rep. Serv. 1177 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1977, writ ref'd
n.r.e.), noted in UCC L. LETTER, Dec. 1977, at 3-4. Contra, Dane County Farmco Coop v.
Paskin (In re Hein), 20 UCC Rep. Serv. 745 (W.D. Wis. 1976) (security interests were invalid
since both husband and wife failed to complete the collateral provision prior to their signing the
documents).
180. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 3.115 (Vernon 1968).
181. 557 F.2d 491 (5th Cir. 1977), rev'g 401 F. Supp. 316 (N.D. Tex. 1975). See notes 173-75
supra and accompanying text.
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sidered the validity under Texas law of the future advance clause on which
the state law claimant relied. The competing parties claimed the proceeds of
the bulk sales of fixtures, equipment, and inventory owned by a bankrupt
supermarket chain. Kimbell's claim was based on sales on open account to
the supermarket chain. Kimbell alleged that payment was secured by agree-
ments entered into by the parties in 1966 and 1968 securing the repayment of
two promissory notes and "the payment of all other indebtedness at any
time hereafter owing by Debtor to Secured Party."182 The Small Business
Administration claimed the proceeds of the bulk sales as successor to the
Republic National Bank whose claim arose from the default by the bankrupt
on a loan guaranteed by the SBA. The federal district judge had held that the
Code had adopted pre-Code Texas case law which limited broad future
advance clauses to future indebtedness that was clearly contemplated by the
parties at the time of making the original agreement and was of the same
nature as the original indebtedness. The appellate court reversed. It agreed
with the district court that Texas courts would uphold the validity of a future
advance clause with respect to a further extension of credit by the secured
party only if reasonably contemplated by the parties when they executed the
agreement containing the clause. The court noted that Texas courts in
analogous circumstances had upheld these clauses. It then examined the
circumstances under which the security agreements were signed and
concluded that freeing current cash flow for the purchase of inventory by
financing the purchase of fixtures was not "unrelated" to the sales of
inventory on open account. "83 Hence, the future advance clause fulfilled the
prerequisites established by Texas law.
C. Priorities
Competing Secured Parties. In Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp. v. Wolfe
City National Bank1" two secured parties claimed priority in collateral held
by a sole proprietor. Borg-Warner had entered into a security agreement
with the debtor covering the debtor's inventory to secure repayment of
certain loans. Borg-Warner had filed a financing statement covering "all
inventory" and also had notified other known creditors. Subsequently,
Wolfe City National Bank advanced funds to the debtor for the purchase of
inventory and took a security interest in the goods. The bank filed financing
statements with the county clerk but not with the secretary of state. On
default by the debtor under the agreements with both secured parties, the
bank repossessed the inventory and sold it over Borg-Warner's request for
its return. At a trial to determine the priority to the proceeds of the sale of
the collateral, the bank argued that Borg-Warner's financing statement had
not given notice of its claim to the "after-acquired property." The court of
civil appeals held that the financing statement's reference to "all inventory"
gave sufficient notice to other creditors of Borg-Warner's claim to after-
182. 557 F.2d at 493.
183. Id. at 494-97.
184. 544 S.W.2d 947, 21 UCC Rep. Serv. 631 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1976, no writ).
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acquired inventory. The court further found that filing with the secretary of
state was necessary to perfect the bank's security interest and that Borg-
Warner's knowledge of the contents of the bank's improperly filed financing
statement did not affect its prior perfected security interest. The court also
noted that Borg-Warner's financing statement had been filed under the name
of the sole proprietor and rejected a suggestion that section 9.402(g) required
a new filing when the sole proprietor changed the name of his business. The
court remanded the case for determination of damages.
Although not discussed by the court in Borg-Warner, the bank in that case
would not only have to file with the secretary of state to perfect its interest
in the debtor's inventory, but it would also have to comply with the provi-
sions of section 9.312(c) of the Code in order to gain priority over Borg-
Warner.
The Fifth Circuit's opinion in Kimbell Foods, Inc. v. Republic National
Bank"'85 also discussed the priority of two secured parties under state law.
Having found that Kimbell had an enforceable security interest in the
proceeds of the collateral, the court held that Kimbell had priority over the
SBA, as assignee of Republic, under state law. The record showed that the
bankrupt had used some of the funds borrowed from Republic for the
purchase of inventory, but Republic had not followed the notice procedures
set forth in section 9.312(c) in order to gain priority over Kimbell. Moreover,
the record did not show that any of the Republic loan had been used for the
purchase of collateral other than inventory; thus Republic and the SBA were
unable to claim priority under section 9.312(d) of the Code which would only
have required that the security interest be perfected at the time the bankrupt
received possession of the collateral or within ten days thereafter. Finally,
the court held that even though Kimbell extended credit to the bankrupt
after the filing of a financing statement by Republic, this future advance
related back to the original filing, giving Kimbell priority under the first-to-
file rule of section 9.312(e)(1)." s
Secured Party vs. Landlord. Section 9.104(2) of the Code explicitly ex-
cludes the landlord's lien from the coverage of article 9; the scope of the
landlord's lien is determined elsewhere. Occasionally, however, the land-
lord's lien is competing with a secured party claiming a perfected security
interest under article 9. In Bank of North America v. Kruger87 a landlord
and a secured party both claimed priority in the personal property of the
lessee of the premises. The lease agreement granted the landlord a lien on all
of the lessee's personal property, but the landlord did not file a financing
statement. The bank subsequently made a loan to the lessee, secured by
equipment, motors, and other personal property, and immediately filed the
185. 557 F.2d 491 (5th Cir. 1977), rev'g 401 F. Supp. 316 (N.D. Tex. 1975); see notes 173-75,
181-83 supra and accompanying text.
186. 557 F.2d at 497-98. The court noted that the 1972 amendments to the Code, which were
adopted in Texas in 1973, explicitly adopted the rule that gives future advances priority from
the date of the original filing. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 9.312(g) (Vernon Supp. 1978).




necessary financing statements. On default the bank brought suit to fore-
close, and the sheriff levied on the debtor-lessee's personal property. The
landlord then sued the lessee and also sued the bank for conversion. The
appellate court reversed a judgment for the landlord. The court first ex-
amined the lien allegedly arising under the lease agreement and held that this
contractual lien had to be filed to be perfected, citing pre-Code authority.
1 88
Section 9.104(2) of the Code, it stated, excluded only statutory landlords'
liens from the coverage of article 9. The landlord's interest in the lease
agreement was therefore unperfected because there had been no filing. As a
result, the bank's perfected security interest was held to have priority over
the landlord's unperfected interest. The appellate court also found that the
bank's actual knowledge of the prior unperfected security interest did not
indicate that the bank lacked good faith so as to necessitate subordinating its
security interest to that of the landlord. The court, however, left open the
possibility that if lack of good faith were established by additional facts, it
might subordinate the perfected security interest otherwise legally entitled
to priority. The court also examined the landlord's rights to a statutory
lien.189 The court construed the statute as giving the landlord priority over
the article 9 secured party only during the first year of the lease contract."9
The court found that a full year had elapsed and the landlord's lien had
become subordinate.
Secured Party vs. "Owner." In Poteet v. Winter Garden Production Credit
Association'91 both a secured party and an "owner" claimed cattle held by
the debtor. The debtor operated a feed lot, and Poteet claimed that the
debtor acted as his agent in the purchase and care of the cattle. The secured
party claimed the cattle under a security agreement which extended to "all
livestock hereafter acquired by Debtor."' 192 The appellate court noted the
absence of findings of fact which would indicate whether or not the debtor
had ever acquired rights in the cattle so as to allow the secured party's after-
acquired property interest to attach. In the absence of findings of fact which
would resolve this issue, the court presumed that the debtor had purchased
the cattle for himself and later had resold them to Poteet. The court then
assumed without argument that the attached security interest would prevail
over the owner 93 and affirmed the lower court's judgment in favor of the
secured party.
188. Shwiff v. City of Dallas, 327 S.W.2d 598 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1959, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
189. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5238 (Vernon 1962).
190. As authority for this construction the court cited Radford v. Bacon Sec. Co., 18 S.W.2d
848 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1929, no writ).
191. 546 S.W.2d 650, 21 UCC Rep. Serv. 645 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1977, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
192. Id. at 652.
193. In the usual case the court would have to consider the possibility that Poteet was a
"buyer in the ordinary course" who took free of the security interest. TEX. Bus. & COMM.
CODE ANN. §§ 1.201(9), 9.307(a) (Vernon Supp. 1978). This case, however, probably falls within
the "farm" exception to that rule. The cattle are "farm products" and a cattle feed lot operator
is probably "engaged in farming operations." Id. §§ 9.109(3), .307(a) (Vernon Supp. 1978).
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Secured Party vs. Mechanic. In Miller & Freeman Ford, Inc. v. Greater
Houston Bank' 94 both a bank, which had financed the purchase of a pickup
truck, and a dealer, which had repaired the pickup, claimed the proceeds
arising from a judicial sale of the truck. The bank claimed it had secured its
purchase money security interest prior to the repairs and moved for sum-
mary judgment. The dealer also filed a motion for summary judgment along
with an affidavit averring that the repairs were authorized by the debtor's
husband. The Texas Supreme Court held that, although the dealer's af-
fidavit was insufficient to sustain its motion for summary judgment, it did
raise a fact issue concerning the existence of a statutory lien 195 which
precluded the court from granting the bank's motion.
D. The Rights of Parties After Default
When a debtor is in default under a security agreement, the secured party
has the rights and remedies provided in part 5 of article 9, including a
number of mandatory provisions which cannot be disclaimed by the par-
ties. 96 One such provision is section 9.504 which requires that every aspect
of the disposition of repossessed collateral must be commercially rea-
sonable. What constitutes commercially reasonable disposition was recently
considered by the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Terrey.'97 Having
concluded that the Small Business Administration had agreed that Texas law
would govern its conduct when repossessing and disposing of the debtor's
business, the court reviewed the record to determine if the SBA had
complied with the standard set out in section 9.504. The court questioned the
weight given to some factors by the trial court and suggested a number of
facts in the case on which a jury could rely to find the sale commercially
unreasonable: the SBA decided to auction the assets of the debtor only two
days after the assets had been turned over to the SBA; the SBA did not
negotiate the private sale of partially completed products; the SBA refused
to postpone a public auction in order to allow further negotiations for the
sale of the business as a unit; the SBA placed unreasonable limitations on
negotiations with third parties interested in purchasing the business; and the
amount realized at the public auction was substantially less than the alleged
market value of the semi-finished inventory or of the business as a whole. 198
The appellate court reversed the trial court's judgment for the SBA and
remanded the case for a new trial.
194. 544 S.W.2d 925 (Tex. 1976).
195. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5503 (Vernon Supp. 1978).
196. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. §§ 1.102(c) (Vernon 1968), 9.501(c) (Vernon 1968 &
Supp. 1978). In addition to the Terrey decision discussed in the text see Anterbury v. American
Bank & Trust Co., 553 S.W.2d 943, 949 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1977, no writ).
197. 554 F.2d 685, 21 UCC Rep. Serv. 1488 (5th Cir. 1977); see notes 169-72 supra and
accompanying text.
198. For an "excellent picture of a reasonably commercial disposition of collateral" the
court cited Old Colony Trust Co. v. Penrose Indus. Corp., 280 F. Supp. 698 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd,
398 F.2d 310 (3d Cir. 1968). 554 F.2d at 694 n.9; see TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. §§ 9.504(c),




Assignment of Security Agreement. In John Deere Co. v. Neal'99 the assig-
nee of chattel paper arising from the sale of a tractor brought suit against the
buyer to enforce the note signed by the buyer. The buyer defended by
arguing that he was authorized under section 9.318(c) of the Code to make
payments on the note to the assignor until notified that payment was to be
made to the assignee. The plaintiff sought to rely on the negotiable instru-
ment provisions of article 3, and argued that section 9.104(6) should be read
broadly to exclude all non-financing sales. The court, however, found no
reason to give an expansive reading to the enumerated limitations on the
scope of article 9 set out in section 9.104. The court then reviewed the
requirements of a notice of assignment under section 9.318 and found that
due to the defendant's lack of experience in secured transactions, his knowl-
edge of facts from which he should have concluded that the assignee had a
right to collect payments on the note fell short of the requirement of section9.318(c). 2°
Consignments. The Fifth Circuit in Looney v. Nuss201 reversed a turnover
order with respect to the return to the trustee in bankruptcy of art works
consigned by the bankrupt for sale at an art gallery. The consignment arose
in an attempt prior to bankruptcy to satisfy a creditor. The art works were
irrevocably consigned to the art gallery, the consignor retained control over
the sales prices, and the proceeds were assigned to the creditor who agreed
to suspend suit on the debt. The art gallery was informed of this arrange-
ment by a letter from the bankrupt. The trial court had found that the
documents, when read together, gave the creditor a security interest in the
proceeds of sale rather than in the art works. The appellate court disagreed
and found that the bankrupt had granted his creditor a security interest in the
art works themselves. The security interest was perfected under sections
9.304(c) and 9.305 by the letter to the art gallery, the bailee of the art
works.202 Perfection occurred before the filing of the petition in bankruptcy,
and, thus, the secured party had priority over the interest of the trustee in
bankruptcy.
199. 544 S.W.2d 514, 20 UCC Rep. Serv. 1332 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1976, no writ).
200. The court did not cite or discuss the definitions of "notice" and "receives a notice"
which appear in article I of the Code. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 1.201(25), (26) (Vernon
1968).
201. 545 F.2d 916 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 97 S. Ct. 1687 (1977). For recent legislation giving
the consignor of art works in effect a perfected security interest, see the Artists' Consignment
Act discussed in notes 14-18 supra and accompanying text.
202. In an interesting footnote the court noted that since there was a written security
agreement there was no need to decide whether notice to a bailee of the secured party's interest
would satisfy the statute of frauds provision in § 9.203(a)(1). That section concerns the
attachment of security interests and requires either possession by the secured party or a written
agreement signed by the debtor. The court said it was unnecessary to decide whether the
possession by the bailee together with the notice of the assignment would suffice for attach-
ment as well as perfection of the security interest. 545 F.2d at 919 n.6.
[Vol. 32
COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS
Field Warehouse. In Utica National Bank & Trust Co. v. Happy Wheat
Growers, Inc.20 3 a secured party brought an action against a field ware-
houseman for delivering cattle held in the warehouse to a buyer without
promptly forwarding confirmations of delivery. The court held that the
requirement that the confirmation of delivery be sent was an independent
convenant and not a condition. Being a covenant, the secured party's action
was for breach of contract; thus, in order to prevail, it had to prove that any
damages were foreseeable. The trial court's rejection of a special verdict on
causation of damages was reversible error, and the case was remanded for a
new trial limited to the issues of the existence, type, and amount of
damages.
Impairment of Collateral. In Commercial Credit Equipment Corp. v. Hat-
ton2" a federal district court held that a surety, who had informed the
assignee of a security agreement that the collateral, an airplane, was being
used for commercial purposes in violation of the security agreement, was
not discharged from his suretyship liability by the assignee's failure to
repossess. The court found that the surety was not discharged under either
section 3.606 or section 34.02 of the Texas Business and Commerce Code.2 °5
As to section 3.606(a)(1) 2 6 the court ruled that the failure to repossess the
airplane was not an agreement to suspend the right to enforce the instrument
against the debtor, and in any case, the surety had waived the protection of
this provision by a waiver clause in his agreement with the secured party.
The court further held that discharge under section 3.606(a)(2) for impair-
ment of collateral required the secured party to be in possession, a circum-
stance not present here. The court supported this holding by reference to
Code comments, pre-Code Texas case law, and the practical difficulties to
which an opposite rule would lead by forcing a secured party to investigate
every allegation of impairment of collateral by the debtor. The court noted
that the surety could protect himself by paying the indebtedness and pro-
ceeding in the shoes of the secured party against the debtor: "Let the one
who complains of the cold fetch in the firewood.' '207 The court found section
34.02 inapplicable because the surety had not requested the secured party to
sue on the contract. Even if the request to repossess could be so construed,
the court found that the secured party had satisfied section 34.02 by pro-
ceeding within a reasonable time.
203. 558 F.2d 279 (5th Cir. 1977).
204. 429 F. Supp. 997, 22 UCC Rep. Serv. 118 (N.D. Tex. 1977).
205. Under § 34.02, if a cause of action has accrued on a contract, a surety by written notice
may require the obligee to sue on the contract. If the obligee fails to initiate suit during the first
term of court after receiving the notice, then the surety is discharged from all liability under the
contract. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 34.02 (Vernon J968).
206. Section 3.606(a)(1) provides that the holder of a negotiable instrument discharges a
party if without the party's consent the holder releases a person against whom the party has a
right of recourse or agrees to suspend the right to enforce the instrument against such person.
Id. § 3.606(a)(1).




A. Article 7 Cases
Article 7 of the Uniform Commercial Code governs the storage and
carriage of goods. Perhaps because professionals are involved in storage and
carriage and these professional bailees are regulated by state and federal
regulatory legislation, there is relatively little litigation construing article 7
provisions. Nevertheless, a handful of Texas cases arose during this survey
period.
Cotton farmers and the Amarillo court seem to go together in the Texas
reports. In R.E. Huntley Cotton Co. v. Fields2 8 the plaintiff cotton farmers
brought an action to recover warehouse receipts and to enjoin the defend-
ants from removing the cotton from the warehouses. The plaintiffs had
transferred the warehouse receipts to a broker and had received checks in
payment which were later dishonored because of insufficient funds. The
warehouse receipts stated that upon return of the receipt the cotton "will be
delivered to the above named depositor or its order, or bearer. '" 2° The
broker sold the receipts to defendant cotton companies. The trial court
granted a temporary injunction, but the appellate court held that this was an
abuse of discretion due to the existence of an adequate remedy at law. The
court further held that the plaintiffs had not shown they had a right to
recover. Noting both "order" and "bearer" language in the receipt, the
court held that under section 7.104(a)(1) it was a bearer receipt which did not
require indorsement, and, thus, could be negotiated by delivery alone under
section 7.501(b)(1). The court noted that its conclusion was consistent with
practice in the cotton business and prior case law. It also found no evidence
that the defendants had acted in bad faith and, as a result, held that the
receipts had been duly negotiated as defined by section 7.501(d).
In Elizabeth-Perkins, Inc. v. Morgan Express, Inc. 210 the plaintiff consig-
nee sought to recover the value of lost dresses from the carrier. The carrier
admitted losing the dresses but claimed that a tarriff of its rates which it had
filed with the Railroad Commission limited its liability to $50 unless a greater
value was declared by the consignor. Here no value had been declared, and
the court held that the consignee could only recover $50. It rejected the
consignee's argument that section 7.309(b)211 required the carrier to show
that it had expressly called the liability limitation to the attention of the
consignor. When a tariff has been filed, the court noted, the carrier need
only afford the consignor a chance to declare a higher value.
In Mitsui & Co. (U.S.A.), Inc. v. Ramsey Truck Lines, Inc.212 a foreign
seller sued an American common carrier for damaging goods in transit.
208. 551 S.W.2d 472, 21 UCC Rep. Serv. 1157 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
209. Id. at 474.
210. 554 S.W.2d 216, 22 UCC Rep. Serv. 771 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, no writ).
211. This section allows a carrier to limit his liability, but only if the carrier's rates are
dependent upon value and the consignor is afforded an opportunity to declare value higher than
the limit. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 7.309(b) (Vernon 1968).
212. 554 S.W.2d 738 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1977, no writ).
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Some damage to the goods had been discovered before delivery to the
defendant carrier, but the seller alleged that the defendant caused further
damages. The appellate court upheld judgment for the defendant. The court
held that where a plaintiff had failed to prove that the shipment was in good
condition when delivered to the defendant there was no presumption that
the defendant common carrier caused the damage. The court noted that
there was conclusive evidence that the goods were materially damaged
before the common carrier accepted them.
Following a flimflam which fooled everyone and left a bank $13,000 out of
pocket, the bank in Purolater Service, Inc. v. Citizens National Bank2 13
sought to recover its losses from the armored car service for misdelivering
the money. A jury found the bank negligent in failing to check the authentic-
ity of the flimflam man and in failing to indicate clearly to the armored car
service where and to whom the money was to be delivered. The jury also
found that this negligence proximately caused the loss. The bank argued,
however, that misdelivery was a conversion and that contributory negli-
gence, therefore, was not a defense. Without discussing the possible rele-
vance of the Code, the appellate court disagreed and held the bailee-carrier
not liable for the loss proximately caused by the bailor-bank.
B. Arbitration
Whether an arbitration award is enforceable under Texas law was at issue
in L.H. Lacy Co. v. City of Lubbock.214 The parties had entered into a
construction contract for the improvement of the runway and taxiway at the
Lubbock Regional Airport. The contract included an arbitration provision
drafted by the defendant which stated in part:
The decision of the arbiters upon any question submitted to arbitration
under this contract shall be a condition precedent to any right of legal
action. The decision of the arbiter or arbiters may be filed in court to
carry it into effect. 215
After completing construction the plaintiff sought arbitration of disputes
between the parties. The defendant city objected from the beginning on the
ground that the Texas General Arbitration Act did not apply, but continued
to participate in the proceedings until a final award was granted. Although
the Texas General Arbitration Act specifically excludes arbitration of
construction contracts from its scope, 216 the Texas Supreme Court reaffirm-
ed the continuing applicability of common law arbitration principles as an
alternative to the statute. Applying these common law rules, the court
concluded that an enforceable award had been made because the defendant
had not met the burden of proving that it had unequivocally withdrawn from
the arbitration proceedings before the award was made. The court dismissed
the defendant's jurisdictional objections on the ground that they referred to
213. 546 S.W.2d 935 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1977, no writ).
214. 21 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 72 (Nov. 26, 1977), rev'g 546 S.W.2d 373 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1976).
215. Id. at 73.
216. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 224 (Vernon 1973).
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the inapplicability of the statutory arbitration provisions, which in fact
indicated defendant's awareness that common law arbitration was involved.
If it had wished to revoke the executory arbitration agreement, defendant
should have refused to participate in the arbitration proceedings from the
outset.217
More important than the holding in the Lacy case, however, was the
court's restatement of public policy with respect to arbitration and its
conclusion that: "While it is unnecessary in this case to alter common law
arbitration rules, the policy of refusing specific enforcement to executory
arbitration agreements is not justifiable when the case fits within the
common mold." 2"8 The court noted that the common law rule refusing
specific enforcement of an agreement to arbitrate future disputes had arisen
at a time when court congestion was not a problem as it is today. The court
also stressed the flexibility, efficiency, and privacy provided by commercial
arbitration. In sum, "in modern times a policy encouraging agreements to
arbitrate is preferable.1 219 In the proper case the supreme court might be
willing to enforce an executory arbitration agreement under judicial
common law when the statute is not applicable. This would bring the
common law rule in line with the policy underlying the statutory rule.
C. Guaranty Agreements
Compared with last year there are relatively few court decisions in this
survey period concerned with guaranty agreements and the rights and obli-
gations of guarantors. 2 ° Cases continue to reflect confusion because of the
overlap of a number of different concepts and statutes: accommodation
parties and guarantors on negotiable instruments, 221 traditional suretyship
concepts ,222 and usury legislation. 223
217. The court of civil appeals had held that the original contractual provision was void and
that defendant had never agreed to arbitrate after the dispute arose. The court had, therefore,
distinguished cases which discussed whether there was revocation of an enforceable agree-
ment. 546 S.W.2d at 377. In effect, the Texas Supreme Court held that there was a voidable, but
not void, arbitration agreement which was never avoided ("revoked").
218. 21 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 74.
219. Id.
220. See also Hopkins v. First Nat'l Bank, 546 S.W.2d 84 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi,
1976), writ ref'd n.r.e. per curiam, 551 S.W.2d 343 (Tex. 1977) (if a guaranty contract does not
specify where the agreement may be enforced, but the note secured by the guaranty agreement
does specify a particular county, then the defendant guarantor may be sued in the county in
which the principal obligor is sued); Gubitosi v. Buddy Schoellkopf Prods., Inc., 545 S.W.2d
528, 534-35 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1976, no writ).
221. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. §§ 3.415, .416 (Vernon 1968). See generally Peters,
Suretyship Under Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 77 YALE L.J. 833 (1968). For an
example of the failure to examine closely the underlying concepts see Knick v. Green, 545
S.W.2d 269, 272 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The guarantor in Knick
apparently signed a separate guaranty agreement rather than the negotiable instrument, but the
court relies on § 3.416 of the Code for the proposition that an "unqualified" guarantor becomes
liable as the original guarantor, overlooking the traditional rights of the guarantor-surety. See
note 222 infra. See also Cleburne Nat'l Bank v. Kenedco, Inc., 547 S.W.2d 67 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Waco 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (guarantor who signs guaranty agreement but is not party to
note apparently relies on § 3.606 of the Code with respect to discharge of "party to the
instrument" where collateral impaired).
222. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. §§ 34.01-.05 (Vernon 1968); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT.
ANN. arts. 1986, 1987 (Vernon 1964); TEX. R. Civ. P. 31.




In Maykus v. Texas Bank & Trust Co. 224 the defendant argued that there
was no consideration for the written guaranty agreement. To demonstrate
this he produced evidence showing that the guaranty agreement had been
signed after the note was signed. The court held that the statutory presump-
tion225 that written contracts are supported by consideration applied not only
to the note but also to the guaranty agreement. The mere showing that the
guaranty agreement was signed after the note did not rebut this statutory
presumption.
The scope of a guarantor's right to be subrogated to the creditor's rights
against the principal debtor and co-guarantors is illustrated in Highland
Cable Television, Inc. v. Wong. 226 In this case one guarantor paid the
underlying obligation and the creditor endorsed the note and assigned the
guaranty agreements to the guarantor. The guarantor then recovered judg-
ment against the co-guarantors for their proportionate share of the guaranty
obligation plus attorney's fees. The co-guarantors argued on appeal that
they were liable only in an action in contribution, which would not allow for
the recovery of attorney's fees. The appellate court held, however, that the
guarantor who paid the debt was subrogated to the creditor's rights, includ-
ing rights to security. 227 In the absence of pleading that the attorney's fees
had not been agreed to or that the fees were unreasonable, the court stated
that the amount for fees provided in the note would be enforceable by the
guarantor who was transferee of the note.
D. Sunday Sales
A case brought under the "Sunday Sale" statute, 228 which prohibits the
sale of certain items on specified days, survived an attack on the constitu-
tional ground of discriminatory enforcement in S.S. Kresge Co. v. State.2 29
The action for a permanent injunction had been initiated on the complaint of
the Dallas Retail Merchants Association. The court found no showing that
there had been clearly intentional discrimination on the part of the district
attorney. The court distinguished the recent New York case of People v.
Acme Markets, Inc. 230 in which the New York court found that enforcement
of the statute had been delegated to private parties. The court found the
New York and Texas statutes distinguishable in that private parties in Texas
are authorized to file for injunctive relief, but enforcement is not limited to
private parties.
224. 550 S.W.2d 396 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, no writ).
225. TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 27 (Vernon 1969).
226. 547 S.W.2d 324 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
227. 547 S.W.2d at 326. The court cites both the Code and case law as authority for its
conclusion as to subrogation. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. §§ 3.201, .603(b) (Vernon 1968).
Fox v. Kroeger, 119 Tex. 511, 35 S.W.2d 679 (1931); Seale v. Hudgens, 538 S.W.2d 459 (Tex.
Civ. App.-San Antonio 1976, writ dism'd).
228. TEX. REV. CIv..STAT art. 9001 (Vernon Supp. 1978).
229. 546 S.W.2d 928 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The court summarily
rejected the argument that art. 9001 violated the due process and equal protection clauses of the
United States and Texas Constitutions, citing Gibson Prods.Co. v. State, 545 S.W.2d 128 (Tex.
1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 2677 (1977). 546 S.W.2d at 929.
230. 37 N.Y.2d 326, 334 N.E.2d 555, 372 N.Y.S.2d 590 (1975).
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E. Third-Party Creditor Beneficiary
An attempt to distinguish previous cases which had held that a short-term
lender was not a third-party creditor beneficiary of a long-term commitment
failed in Exchange Bank & Trust Co. v. Lone Star Life Insurance Co. 23' The
court found that the commitment letter could not be interpreted as obligating
the long-term lender to purchase the short-term note, even though the letter
contained references to the short-term lender. Nor did the court find that the
long-term lender had made a direct promise to the short-term lender to
purchase its loan.
231. 546 S.W.2d 948 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, no writ). The cases which plaintiff
sought to distinguish were Briercroft Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Foster Fin. Corp., 533 S.W.2d 898
(Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.), and Republic Nat'l Bank v. National
Bankers Life Ins. Co., 427 S.W.2d 76 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
